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Abstract
Cybersecurity risk is dynamic and rapidly evolving. Today, cyber incidents can significantly
impair government operations, erode public confidence, undermine operations of critical
infrastructures, and put citizen data and whole industries at risk. Managing these risks to cyber
assets must be part of a state’s overall risk management portfolio. To do this successfully, state
leaders must have effective cybersecurity governance. To achieve this, governors and state
legislatures must ensure that their states have the essential governance mechanisms necessary for
understanding and managing cybersecurity risk and for translating awareness about cyber threats
into action. This dissertation gives an overview of three different governance models
(centralized, decentralized, and hybrid), comparing effectiveness of each by state. Most literature
suggests that a centralized cybersecurity governance approach, where one organization is
designated and has authority to make all of the decisions about cybersecurity and IT security, is
the most effective at the state level. However, this is not always feasible due to budget
constraints, lack of trained personnel, and state culture. Comparing Nationwide Cybersecurity
Review (NCSR) governance data and answers from cybersecurity governance interviews with
individuals responsible for cybersecurity in their respective states, this study tests the hypothesis
that states with centralized authority over cybersecurity governance will have higher NCSR
scores (higher scores = more successful cybersecurity programs) than states that utilize a
decentralized or hybrid model. While initial data supports the hypothesis, it also suggests that a
hybrid cybersecurity governance model (encompassing a mixture of centralized and
decentralized) could be the answer for states struggling to become centralized.
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Chapter 1: Cybersecurity Governance
Introduction: The Threats
On June 5, 2019, two Maryland state databases were infiltrated by hackers who were able
to access the names and Social Security numbers of 78,000 people (Seculore Solutions, 2019).
Maryland officials reported that the state responded to the incident by providing two years of
free credit monitoring to people whose information was made vulnerable by the attack. New
Jersey education and state government officials had their email addresses made publicly
available on various PasteBin – text storage sites – posts in March of 2018 (Seculore Solutions,
2019). Emails are now exposed to a variety of phishing scams and social engineering tactics.
Affected officials were told to be on the lookout for these types of scams and viruses to begin
appearing on these email accounts. Steps have also been taken to secure and change the
passwords associated with the leaked accounts. In Texas, on October 26, 2017, a Texas
Department of Agriculture government employee’s state issued laptop was compromised through
a malicious ransomware attack. Roughly 700 total students in almost 40 school districts had their
private information compromised and accessed by the attacker. This information included
names, Social Security numbers, home addresses, dates of birth, and personal phone numbers
(Seculore Solutions, 2019). The Texas Department of Agriculture took immediate action to
fortify and routinely monitor the vulnerabilities within their computer system. Two Iranian
hackers utilized the SamSam ransomware to take over the Atlanta municipal computer system
and demanded a payment to restore it in March of 2018. Atlanta’s city computers were crippled
for more than a week due to an immense amount of vulnerabilities in the system, and eventually
were forced to shut down the system completely. Over six million people were affected by the
breach, and roughly a third of city software programs were either disabled or knocked out
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completely. The city ultimately paid roughly $9.5 million in recovery efforts, and city residents
temporarily had to revert to a paper system while the computers were shut down (Seculore
Solutions, 2019). Richmond, Virginia’s computer system was attacked by the same SamSam
ransomware that crippled Atlanta just weeks before in April of 2018. This attack was mitigated
by Richmond’s information technology (IT) team, which utilized the city’s strong backup system
to enable the system to quickly recover. No external contractors were called, and financial losses
were minimized (Seculore Solutions, 2019).
Cyber threats are evolving, and the risks are increasing (Pardo, Gass, Garcia, Pylant, De
Vallance, and Cooke, 2020, p. 2). Management by silo is the current culture of management.
Visibility into underlying business and technology processes has become an antiquated approach
to understanding and controlling a government environment. Having centralized authority and
decentralized control over cybersecurity has allowed the field in its current state to be uncertain
in regard to the upper legislature in government. Previous models used in other highly successful
practices to include human resources, finance, and legal are not quite the right fit for current
information technology and cybersecurity enabled agencies (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 3). More
importantly, they are not even close enough to make a difference at the cybersecurity level.
Basically, this means that models have to be created and implemented with cybersecurity in
mind. This includes governance models that cybersecurity professionals must follow.
Governance
These governance structures that are required should be holistic, and they should provide
for an overall approach to governing cybersecurity. At the highest level of state government (the
governor’s office), there are certain requirements that a governance program must follow.
Leadership is especially important, as is vision; both should be communicated through a
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hierarchy. There should be ample training and development of the actual “need” for governance
across all levels of state government (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 8). This training and development
should come from the top down. The siloed approach of collaboration has not proven to be
beneficial, nor has it provided the required results. This is especially true given the need for
cybersecurity professionals to react and respond at more granular levels within all state level
agencies. Cost – not only financial – but the cost of adhering to the governance framework,
needs to be justified; there needs to be “buy-in” across all levels of state government. Risk
should also be calculated and controlled at all times. The decisions being made should be based
on an analysis of risk and then aligned to providing information across organizations. This helps
to categorize, analyze, and understand the risks that each level faces. If a complete appreciation
of risk across government is not known, then the cost of adherence is not being attributed
correctly. Risks in cybersecurity are constantly changing; the decision-makers must react and
provide the collaborative assistance to understand the need (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 9). They must
also be able and ready to respond in kind. If the understanding of these needs across state
government is applied correctly, the underlying governance framework (centralized/unified,
decentralized/federated, hybrid) will build upon itself.
“Cybersecurity governance is the process through which humans understand
organizational risk, prioritize resources, and establish procedures to erect technical defenses
against computer-based attacks,” (Garcia, Forscey, and Blute, 2017, p. 254). It is further defined
as “the processes by which decisions are made about cybersecurity risk, and effective programs
that manage that risk to a degree that is acceptable to the governor and legislature,” (Pardo, et al.,
2020, p. 4). States are responsible for protecting their constituents and for preparing public and
private institutions for a widespread cyber disruption. Cybersecurity governance success requires
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a whole-of-state approach that arranges all relevant stakeholders, assigns responsibilities, and
then allocates resources. There is an overlapping of responsibilities between cybersecurity
governance and IT governance.
Cybersecurity Governance Study Overview
This dissertation will look at some of the overlapping responsibilities between IT and
cybersecurity governance and seek to answer the research question: Is a centralized cybersecurity
governance model the most successful (effective and efficient) framework and can this
model/framework be successfully implemented at the state level? This particular question is
important with the rise of recent cyber threats against states and state-level agencies, and a lack
of grounded cybersecurity governance to thwart such attacks. Threats to cybersecurity are an
ever-present and fundamental organizational risk; managing risks to cyber assets must be part of
a state’s overall risk management portfolio (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 3). To do this effectively, state
leaders must have effective cybersecurity governance. The essential governance mechanisms in
the form of frameworks and models is necessary for understanding and managing cybersecurity
risk; it is also important for translating awareness about cyber threats into action. This effort
demands appropriate resources, including but not limited to, fiscal and human capital on a
continuous basis.
The research will look at Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) data at the state
level, and test the hypothesis that states with centralized authority over cybersecurity governance
will have higher NCSR scores (higher scores = more successful cybersecurity programs) than
states that utilize a decentralized or hybrid model. The NCSR score is based on the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework’s (CSF’s) five
functions – identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover – as they relate to cybersecurity
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governance. The five functions are representative of the five “must haves” for a successful and
holistic cybersecurity program (NIST, 2018). In regard to cybersecurity governance at the state
and state agency level, the five functions help leaders explain the management of their
cybersecurity programs, the risks associated with their cybersecurity programs at high levels, and
help with the risk decision-making process. In essence, the assessment of these functions is the
governance model. A good governance model that is implemented and supported could mean the
difference between a successful or thwarted attack (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 5).
Additionally, the study compares NCSR governance data and data collected through 12
telephone interviews with individuals responsible in some way for cybersecurity in their state.
Interviewees included Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), Cyber Operations Officers,
Chief Risk Officers, Chief Security Officers, and Chief Information Officers (CIOs). The
interviews were performed by myself and colleagues at the Center for Internet Security in East
Greenbush, New York. All members of the project team participated in the interviews. The
purpose of the interviews was to aid in the development of a guidance document and checklist
for governors and state legislatures to use in creating and strengthening their cybersecurity
governance.
This study used the analysis of NCSR governance data. High NCSR scores (on a one to
seven-point Likert scale) represent more successful cybersecurity programs; this is according to
the Review’s sponsors, the Department of Homeland Security and the Multi-State Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (part of the Center for Internet Security). Forty-three states
participated in the NCSR, and for the most part, states that utilized centralized authority over
their cybersecurity governance did have higher scores than those that followed a decentralized or
hybrid model of governance (MS-ISAC, 2018). However, there were some exceptions and
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instances where a hybrid model was more effective for some states. The answers received during
the 12 interviews were compared with the data from the NCSR; findings suggest that while most
states would like to utilize a centralized approach to cybersecurity governance, it is not always
possible. States that are centralized in respect to cybersecurity governance, are seeking out ways
to improve their programs; they are taking heed from other state’s centralized governance
programs and even learning from decentralized and hybrid models of governance. Cybersecurity
governance is not one-size fits all; it is often dependent upon a state’s resources, culture,
demographics, and politics. It is also dependent on the state’s needs and associated cybersecurity
risks.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction: Collaboration
The global cost of cyber-attacks is an estimated US$80-400 billion annually (Lewis and
Baker, 2013, p. 5). Cyber threats are one of, if not the most, effective ways to attack an
organization. Phishing, cloning, identity theft, and password thefts are widely used methods of
maliciously compromising an organization. Add to that the human threat of negligent, careless,
or simply uninformed employees, and cybersecurity and cyber defense are critical for
safeguarding an organization's information and processes. Experian’s Managing Insider Risk
through Training and Culture Report found that 66 percent of the data protection and privacy
training professionals surveyed labeled their employees as the “weakest link,” (Miller, 2018).
Clicking on links, opening unknown attachments, and entering personal or confidential
information into a seemingly friendly (and familiar) account are hindering factors against
safeguarding their organization from cyber threats (Miller, 2018). The levels and types of threats
are ever-changing because of technological development. Cyber-espionage, for example, is
rampant in the public sector; state-affiliated actors account for 79 percent of all breaches
involving external actors (Verizon, 2019). Privilege misuse and error by insiders account for 30
percent of breaches, with actor motives being espionage (66%), financial (29%), and other (2%)
breaches (Verizon, 2019). Research has shown that the only way to get a handle on existing and
future threats is through collaborative defense. Specifically, at the state level, a governance
framework consisting of a set of information technology (IT) and cybersecurity governance
models is needed.
Collaborative efforts are only as good as the leaders that oversee them. In the cyber
defense schema, collaboration can be difficult as there are many different governing bodies with
various potential barriers to overcome. The Center for Internet Security, Inc. (CIS), in
7

collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), aims to safeguard private and
public state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) organizations against cyber threats. The
501(c)(3) nonprofit organization is responsible for identifying, developing, validating,
promoting, and sustaining best practice solutions for cyber defense to help people, businesses,
and governments protect themselves from pervasive cyber-attacks (CIS, 2019). CIS runs the
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), which is the ultimate resource
for cyber threat prevention, protection, response, and recovery for U.S. SLTT entities. They also
house the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), which
supports the cybersecurity needs of U.S. State, Local, and Territorial elections offices. CIS is
only one part of the picture in this defense; there are many other pieces to the puzzle that aim to
make the internet and the cyber world safe and secure. Cyber threats can affect everyone in some
form or fashion. While there are collaborative efforts going on to prevent and halt cyber-attacks,
there are also collaborative efforts taking place amongst the hackers themselves.
In order to effectively and efficiently handle the on-going real-world cyber threats,
collaboration is key, and can be done so through collaborative governance regimes (CGRs).
CGRs are very diverse and can range from intergovernmental and interstate arrangements,
interagency work, and government to public service contracting, public-private partnerships, etc.
Under the umbrella of collaborative governance are government agencies, nonprofits,
government agencies as government contractors, and for profits as government contractors. The
everyday citizen also falls under this umbrella.
Collaborative governance is on the rise. Emerson and Nabatchi credit the rise to wicked
problems; these are problems that seem impossible to solve because of changing environments
and their complexity (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 8). There are many reasons why cyber
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defense and cybersecurity are wicked problems. The issue is complex and can happen without
any warning. Identifying system context, drivers, and regime formation for this issue can be
difficult. The drivers for initiating collaborative governance in this respect are those of
uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentivism, and initiating leadership.
Leadership is key in the success and/or failure of such initiatives; it is equally important
that all parties involved are working towards one common goal. Most collaborative governance
occurs when there is a problem that needs to be solved within the context of alternative dispute
resolution. In a cyber defense schema, that problem involves thwarting attacks, protecting the
organization or entity from cyber-attacks, and preventing future attacks. The leakage by Edward
Snowden of information regarding U.S. government surveillance programs, the Mandiant report
which disclosed the existence of China spying on the U.S., and Russia’s involvement in the 2016
presidential election are all significant realisms that cyber threats are happening without us even
knowing. Many governments are attempting to exert sovereignty in cyberspace the same way
they do in physical domains, yet they are struggling to keep up with the pace of technological
advances. The internet environment is becoming more international, and less western-centric
(Nocetti, 2015, p. 111). However, it is mostly U.S.-centric when it comes to cyber policy.
On May 2, 2019, President Donald Trump’s administration issued an executive order on
America’s Cybersecurity Workforce as a set of plans and provisions to grow and strengthen the
nation’s cybersecurity workforce. According to the executive order, “America’s cybersecurity
workforce is a strategic asset that protects the American people, the homeland, and the American
way of life. The National Cyber Strategy, the President’s 2018 Management Agenda, and
Executive Order 13800 of May 11, 2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks
and Critical Infrastructure), each emphasize that a superior workforce will promote American
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prosperity and preserve peace,” (Trump, 2019). The executive order aims to enhance workforce
mobility between the public and private sectors, establish a cybersecurity rotational assignment
program, support the development of cybersecurity skills to maintain a competitive edge in
cybersecurity, and continue to hold heads of executive departments and agencies accountable for
managing cybersecurity risk to their enterprises (Trump, 2019). Along with those provisions, the
order on America’s Cybersecurity Workforce will focus on job training and recognition
programs designed to identify and reward current federal employees that have the potential to
acquire cybersecurity skills.
Literature
The field of cyber defense and cybersecurity is constantly changing, and so are the
threats. When examining an organization’s stance on cybersecurity, it is common to consider
mitigated and accepted risks. It is impossible to stop all cyber threats, and perfect cybersecurity
is not possible (Garcia, Gilligan, and Calkin, 2018, p. 6). Instead, organizations seek to achieve
“reasonable” security; they accept some level of risk and consequences and have a recovery plan
if said consequences occur.
Large-scale cyber-attacks are referred to as cyber acts of war, although there is no
consensus regarding what constitutes cyberwarfare. Almeida (2017) identifies critical
infrastructure sectors as power, water, transportation, and communication systems that are
vulnerable to cyber threats and attacks. These types of attacks would affect more than just
cyberspace; they could have a lasting impact on the physical world. Malicious code such as
viruses, Trojans, rootkits, worms, bots, and spyware can be engaged at any time. Weaponized
zero days – a computer-software vulnerability that is unknown to, or unaddressed by, those who
should be interested in mitigating the vulnerability – can be deployed not only to perpetrate
common cybercrime, but also to engage in cyberwarfare (Almeida, Doneda, and de Souza
10

Abreu, 2017, p. 2). Until the vulnerability is mitigated, hackers can exploit it to adversely affect
computer programs, data, additional computers, or a network. Robert Clarke and Robert Knake
define cyberwarfare as “actions an identified nation-state uses to penetrate another nation’s
computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption,” (Clark and Knake,
2010, p. 6). In this two-state definition, one nation is the source and the other the target.
Contradicting the Clark and Knake definition is Stuxnet, a computer worm developed to
sabotage Iran’s nuclear facilities. The source of the worm is not clear, though it is speculated to
have ties to the U.S. and Israel. A cyber operation can end up being addressed by criminal law as
a cybercrime, or by war and international humanitarian law as an “act of war,” (Almeida, et al.,
2017, pp. 2-3).
Cyberwarfare involves actions that achieve political or military effect; it often involves
the use of cyberspace to deliver direct or cascading kinetic effects, and create results that either
cause or are a crucial component of a serious threat to a nation’s security or that are conducted in
response to such a threat (Almeida, et al., 2017, p. 3). Cyberspace conflicts involve state and
non-state actors on both sides of a conflict to include companies, hackers, individuals, and
groups. The 2016 U.S. presidential election and the cyberspace episodes associated are an
example of cyberwarfare and the evolution of such. In February of 2018, a federal grand jury
indicted 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities on charges connected with the 2016 U.S.
elections (Department of Justice, 2018). Charges included conspiracy to defraud the United
States, conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, and fraud with identification documents.
National Security Correspondent, David Sanger stated that “the attempt of a foreign power to
disrupt the 2016 presidential election is a clear sign of cyber espionage and information-warfare
actions that have been viewed by some analysts as an act of war,” (Almeida, et al., 2017, p. 3).
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These incidences raise questions as to how exactly a country can defend its interests in
cyberspace, and how they can do so collaboratively with internet governance bodies. Initiatives
can be broken down into a few broad categories: cyber defense, cyber deterrence,
cyberpreemption, and cyber arms control. Cyber deterrence aims at dissuading adversaries;
however, because there is often a difficult time to attribute a cyber-attack, it is not a completely
effective strategy (Nye, 2017). Cyberpreemption refers to reducing the capability of the potential
forces of an adversary. A New York Times editorial stated that the best way to reduce cyber risks
is “to accelerate international efforts to negotiate limits on the cyber arms race, akin to the armscontrol treaties of the Cold War” (Almeida, et al., 2017, p. 4). Through an international
framework, cyberspace governance bodies can minimize global cyber threats.
Cyberspace architecture can be broken down into four layers. The bottom layer is the
actual players and people who take part in cyberspace; the second layer is the information stored
in cyberspace; the third layer is made up of the logical building blocks of the services and
platforms; and the top layer is the physical layer which includes the devices and communication
networks. Citizens, government, and private businesses actively participate in all of the layers,
though their roles and levels of participation may vary. National governance bodies
(stakeholders) participate in cyber defense strategies by including cyberwarfare as an agenda
topic, improving communication among state and non-state actors, promoting the discussion of
cyber norms, and proposing cyber “hygiene” initiatives to protect against cyber threats (Almeida,
et al., 2017, p. 4). These governance regimes can help build alliances between stakeholders, the
military, the intelligence community, and society to minimize risks of cyber conflicts.
Cybersecurity and elections are intertwined, and to enable the election process, security
and reliability of elections infrastructure is a growing concern. U.S. based nonprofit, Center for
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Internet Security (CIS), through a best practices approach, aims to help organizations involved in
elections better understand what to focus on with cybersecurity and elections. They offer
guidance to protect information technology systems, and address common threats to this critical
aspect of democracy (Garcia, et al., 2018, p. 2). CIS created a handbook which includes
strategies on how to protect the voting process as part of a national response to threats against
elections infrastructure. The handbook addresses baseline assessments of elections and top-level
assessment of risks, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences; it also provides the reader with
examples of threats and consequences. There are many levels of election infrastructure to include
voter registration, poll books, elections management systems (at the state and local level), vote
capture devices, vote tabulation, and election results publishing (Garcia, et al., 2018, p.15).
Threats and vulnerabilities of electronic vote management can include internet connectivity,
network connections with other internal systems, security weaknesses in hardware and software,
errors in managing authentication, difficulty finding and rolling back improper changes detected,
and infrastructure and process-related issues with backup and auditing (Garcia, et al., 2018, p.
15). The consequences of a successful attack in a vote capture and vote tabulation device are
significant and could alter the outcome of an election.
Breaches
The Verizon Threat Research Advisory Center (VTRAC) – Verizon’s threat intelligence
platform – released the 12th installation of the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report
(DBIR). The DBIR focuses on breaches – an incident that results in the confirmed disclosure of
data to an unauthorized party. The report analyzed data breach trends affecting a variety of
sectors, including public administration, healthcare, and education. Some of the key findings in
the 2019 report are:
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•

52% of breaches featured direct cyber threat actor interaction

•

28% of breaches were caused by malware

•

15% of breaches were due to misuse of access and authorities by authorized users

•

69% of attacks were from external sources, 34% were caused by internal actors

•

39% of attacks were assessed to be directly linked to organized criminal actors

•

23% of all breaches were carried out by nation states (Verizon, 2019).

Four collaborative efforts of cyber defense aim to improve cyber defense information
sharing. These efforts focus on incentives and barriers and types of shareable information,
collaborative risk management, intergovernmental collaborative challenges dealing with
procedural models, and automation of cyber defense data. Information and communication
technologies shared across economies and societies of developed countries pose a high-level and
extensive threat to cybersecurity and cyber defense. Protecting these technologies requires
immense collaboration through governance because they are shared world-wide (Vázquez,
Acosta, Spirito, Brown, and Reid, 2012, p. 430).
Standards
There is a long-standing history throughout the cyber defense community of establishing
and publishing standards for data sharing. This includes creating data-exchange and information
sharing repository standards. Research is continuous, and there is debate in the field regarding
what “data types are useful to share, organizational and national policies about what can be
shared, models for sharing, and how-to best address privacy and security,” (Vázquez, et al.,
2012, p. 431). Coinciding with the debates, understanding what information-sharing networks
are needed, who is participating, what information is desired and/or restricted, privileges,
incentives, and establishing trust within the field fall under incentives and barriers in an
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information sharing community. Engineers often focus on technical aspects of information
sharing networks; they do not take into consideration the social, organizational, and cultural
systems of use, or the governance models that need to be implemented in order to protect and
assess them. This is a huge barrier.
Information is shared according to “its perceived value, purpose, and meaning (Vázquez,
et al., p. 433). It is important that the collaborative parties have mutual orientation towards an
object, a common understanding of the information to be shared, and an understanding of the
potential risks involved. Perception, interpretation, and conventions or instructed actions, must
be the same for members of the collaborative project. Vázquez and colleagues claim that
traditional risk management methodology consists of two phases: risk assessment and
identification of assets, threats, and countermeasures, and risk management which considers the
risk assessment in the decision-making process (Vázquez, et al., 2012, p. 434). These are all
important components of a good cybersecurity governance model.
Procedural Models
Procedural models and information exchange models address individual needs of
participants, allowing collaboration amongst partners. In a cyber defense sharing network,
procedural models address roles, governance structure, funding, enabling collaboration,
information protection and release control, and financial incentive models (Vázquez, et al., 2012,
pp. 435-436). Models are very beneficial as they assign roles and identify the reasoning behind
the collaboration. Models structure meetings and set rules and guidelines; they also address the
information sharing relationships between the collaborative governance regime (CGR) members.
A European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) paper that used the
Milward and Provan model on collaboration networks showed that all networks use three
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constructs; they are run by one from within, run by a coordinating entity, and are democratically
peer led (ENISA, 2011, p. 28). Information sharing networks require a defined collaborative
process. Details of the sharing relationships can vary depending on the type and sensitivity of
information that is being shared. Data could include vulnerability information, threats, software,
hardware, malware, security configurations, weakness information, etc.
From a different perspective, the multi-stakeholder model of global internet governance
has emerged to navigate the complex set of interests, agendas, and implications of the public’s
dependence on global computer networks and technology (Carr, 2015, p. 1). All computer
networks require some level of administration; and, multi-stakeholder organizations have
become synonymous with global internet governance. Carr argues that multi-stakeholder internet
governance serves largely to reinforce existing power relations rather than disrupt them, and that
in itself, privileges the interests of the actors that established it (primarily the U.S. government)
(Carr, 2015, p. 2). The diverse nature is its strength, offering the internet resiliency, stability, and
adaptability. However, a broader cross section of private sector actors needs to be involved and
empowered in the process.
IT Governance
Internet governance is a global political concern. “Twenty-first century economic and
social structures are dependent on internet infrastructure for basic functioning,” (DeNardis and
Raymond, 2013, p. 1). Both are constantly changing and evolving. Cybersecurity governance
includes securing network infrastructure, designing encryption standards, cybersecurity
regulation/enforcement, correcting software security vulnerabilities, software patch management,
securing routing, addressing and Domain Name System (DNS), responding to security problems,
and trust intermediaries authenticating websites. Primary institutional actors include Internet
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Service Providers (ISPs), network operators, private end-users, standards-setting organizations,
national statutes/multilateral agreements, software companies, Internet Engineering Task Forces
(IETFs), registries, computer emergency response teams/computer security incident response
teams (CERTs/CSIRTs), and certificate authorities (DeNardis and Raymond, 2013, p. 5).
Internet governance is not a singular enterprise; there are many different layers. There are
many possible types of multi-stakeholder governance regimes dependent on the types of actors
involved and the nature of authority relations between the actors. Actors are states, formal
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and firms, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil
society groups or movements, and individuals acting on their own behalf. These actors are often
involved in transnational advocacy networks (TANs) to help with the collaborative efforts.
Ronald Deibert and Masashi Crete-Nishihata introduced cyberspace within the global
digital communications environment as embedded in political, economic, and social activity
(Deibert and Crete-Nishihata, 2012, p. 339). Information controls are a highly researched area
within cyberspace and involve the actions that seek to deny, disrupt, manipulate, and shape
information and communication for strategic and political ends. It is for that reason, that there
needs to be global governance of cyberspace controls in the form of policies and regulations. It is
important to consider the international dynamics and mechanisms of cyberspace controls as
unique processes that occur at the international level, different from the domestic state level. A
lot of disruptions with cyber-attacks are not reversible. However, “a large and distributed social
movement, which cuts across civil society, the private sector, and governments aims to protect
and preserve cyberspace as an open common of global information,” (Diebert, Crete-Nishihata,
2012, p. 355). This will require legal, regulatory, and discursive intervention followed by a
rigorous checks and balances system.
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Global Commons
Global commons – sea, air, space, and cyberspace – enable militaries to protect national
territory and interests; they also help to facilitate the passage of goods, people, communication,
and data upon which every member of the international community depends (Murphy, 2010, p.
28). Murphy states that the security of one global common is tightly linked to the security of all
global commons. These global commons exist beyond the sovereign bounds of any nation, and
collaborative governance must be achieved through international treaty or agreement.
Cyberspace is the most unique of the commons as it is man-made and facilitates the
transfer of information and data; it is also in large part owned by the private sector. It is the issue
of ownership that complicates governance and requires a high level of public and private sector
cooperation and collaboration. Attribution is also a challenge in the cyberspace common as
pinpointing the source of an attack has serious implications for reprisal and deterrence (Murphy,
2010, p.40). The greatest vulnerability is the infrastructure. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense
William Lynn underscored this vulnerability at a discussion on cybersecurity:
“With 15,000 networks and 7 million computing devices used by our Department, we
have formally recognized cyberspace for what it is – a domain similar to land, sea, air,
and space. A domain that we must depend upon and protect,” (Murphy, 2010, p.40).
The U.S. is virtually under constant cyber-attacks that go beyond the Defense Department into
critical infrastructure systems such as power grids and transportation systems. Twenty-first
century global challenges demand global solutions between both private and public sectors, the
global state, and non-state actors.
There has been some government resistance to cybersecurity in the private sector. The
U.S. faces major cyber-attacks by criminals and agents of foreign governments; these attacks
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affect the military and the private sector alike. Protecting the private sector is important because
the U.S. relies so heavily on private corporations to ensure national security. Corporations
manufacture most of the nation’s arms, software and hardware, and carry out many critical
security functions to include the collection and processing of intelligence and the conduct of
covert operations (Etzioni, 2011, p. 58). This began during the administration of President
George W. Bush and has only slightly been scaled back in the current administration. It is
interesting to think that at one time, security was only provided to the computers and internet
used by the public sector.
Today’s cyber defense is not completely effective against most forms of advanced cyberattacks. A cyber preparedness framework can help an organization provide insight into threats
and provide ideas on ways to counter threats. The framework is unique and specific to an
organization and can be characterized by the nature of the threat, the technical and operational
capabilities that the organization has to combat the threat, and process capabilities to include,
risk assessment and governance policies and processes that the organization uses to determine its
cyber threat level. Organizations that have the potential to face cyber threats should have a
commensurate level of preparedness. A cyber threat level of 1 for cyber vandalism should have a
level 1 cyber preparedness level of perimeter defense. Level 2 cyber threat level of cyber
theft/crime corresponds with critical information protection, level 3 cyber incursion/surveillance
has a cyber preparedness level of critical information protection; level 4 cyber
sabotage/espionage should have a cyber preparedness level of architectural resilience, and level 5
cyber conflict/warfare should have a commensurate level of pervasive agility (Bodeau, Graubart,
and Fabius-Greene, 2009, p. 3). The preparedness levels and their corresponding threat levels
should be defined (through roles and responsibilities) in a governance framework or model.
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While current approaches to cybersecurity are not entirely effective, the threat arising
from cyberspace to national security to human-centric information ethics could be detrimental.
The problem with cybersecurity is that it is under produced, both in a traditional state-focused
national security sense, and from a human security perspective (Cavelty, 2014, p. 710). The issue
is directly linked to power-struggles, war-fighting, and military action. States are spending more
money on cyber-offense, which is leading to less security. The type of cybersecurity that is being
produced is based on economic maxims, often not considering security needs (Cavelty, 2014, p.
711). Extending national security based on cyberspace could have an impact on civil liberties
including the right to privacy and free speech. Cyber-exploitation linked to the manipulation of
vulnerabilities is also plaguing cyberspace and making it less secure. Ethics needs to be
considered especially now that cyberspace has become more than just a technological realm; it
has become a fundamental part of life and is constantly changing.
There is a considerable insecurity in cyberspace security because offense is cheaper than
defense. Because of this, many people think it is ungovernable; however, in practice, there are
many areas of private and public governance. Technical standards related to internet protocols
are set by consensus among engineers involved in the non-governmental Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and others (Nye, 2014, p. 5). How
these standards are applied often depends upon corporate decisions and their inclusion in
commercial products. Applying the framework developed by Elinor Ostrom, cyberspace is
categorized as a common pool resource; exclusion is difficult and exploitation by one party can
subtract value from other parties (Nye, 2014, p. 6). Ostrom said that government is not the sole
solution. However, providing security is a classic function of government and has led to an
increased role for governments and governance in cyberspace. The number of criminal attacks
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has increased with estimates of global costs ranging from US$80-400 billion annually (Lewis
and Baker, 2013, p. 5). This is affecting corporations such as banking and financial firms who
are developing their own systems of security and punishment through networks of
connectedness. They deprive repeat offenders of trading rights, slow speeds, and raise
transaction costs for addresses that are suspected of cyber-attacks.
Regimes are a subset of norms (descriptive, prescriptive, or both) which are shared
expectations about appropriate behavior. They can be institutionalized and have a hierarchy.
Norms can be mixed with institutions and procedures in both large and small scale. The Regime
Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities consists of intelligence community alliances,
international law conventions, human rights regimes, government groupings, telecom regimes,
regional organizations, civil rights organizations, international finance institutions, trade regimes,
intellectual property regimes, and law enforcement cooperation (Nye, 2014, p. 12). Inside of that
outer circle are corporate decisions, incident response regimes, conferences, independent
commissions, industrial ICT standards, and international policy standards. Issues in the cyber
regime complex include DNS/standards, crime, war/sabotage, espionage, privacy, content
control, and human rights (Nye, 2014, p. 12).
Progress is being made in the cyber regime complex. An example is the increase in the
number of states acceding to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, and
INTERPOL has established a cybercrime center in Singapore (Nye, 2014, p. 12). However, trust
still remains an issue. There have been many attacks and analysts reinforce their pessimistic
projections by pointing to realist theories about the decline of U.S. hegemony over the internet
(Nye, 2014, p. 12). One thing is clear; predicting normative structures that will govern
cyberspace is impossible with the rapid changes in economic and political interests, and the
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social and generational cognitive evolution that affects how state and non-state actors understand
and define their interests (Nye, 2014, p. 13).
Cybersecurity Governance
Attempts to understand state cybersecurity arrangements, programs, policies, and
approaches in a comparative way are ongoing but still immature undertakings. Most attempts
have been made by journalists for reasons of public awareness, oversight, and illustrating the
state of affairs for experts in the field. These range from work by state and local specific
publications like State Tech magazine, Gov Tech magazine and Route Fifty, to journalistic
coverage by national outlets ranging from Vice to the New York Times focused on narrower highprofile issues like state election security or state data breaches. However, this journalism is not
designed to assess the success of different states, programs, or approaches, and certainly is not
intended to do so in any systematic or comparative way.
There have been a few attempts to compare and evaluate in a more systematic way, but it
is not yet as mature as things undertaken in other fields – something like the American Societies
of Civil Engineers (ASCE) report card approach to comparative assessment of state
infrastructure. Nonprofits, research institutes, contractors, think-tanks, and even individual
researchers have made attempts to look at state cybersecurity structures and practices in a
systematic and comparable way. However, none have examined all fifty states rigorously or in
depth, AND focused solely on the issue of cybersecurity governance. Some have looked at issues
of cyber governance, and one has looked at one particular area of cyber governance across fifty
states, but holistic and in-depth analysis of state cyber processes is a major - and expensive undertaking.
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The researcher Francesca Spidalieri attempted to capture some insight about key state
response capabilities and response capabilities for eight states, in her report for the Pell Center
(Spidalieri, 2015). While this touched on governance issues, they were not the main focus of the
report. She identified a predominant method to combat cyber risks today by pursuing the latest
security products, tools, and technology plans, noting that technology is key, but not the only
necessary component (Spidalieri, 2015). Education and training users is crucial to effectively
implement advances in state cybersecurity measures. States should work on partnership building
with the larger security community, including “federal, state, and local stakeholders, to
coordinate security efforts and equip state employees with the necessary education and training”
(Spidalieri, 2015, p. 4). For critical infrastructure security, states are leveraging laws, regulations,
standards, market incentives, and other initiatives to align state priorities with national priorities.
Spidalieri also summarized a given state’s “cyber readiness” based on the Cyber Readiness Index
1.0 (CRI) scale, which is comprised of five essential areas: State Cyber Security Strategic Plan,
Incident Response, E-Crime and Law Enforcement, Information Sharing, Cyber Research and
Development, Education, and Capacity Building.
Natasha Cohen and Brian Nussbaum examined three state’s innovative approaches to
particular components of state cybersecurity in depth, looking at Arizona, New Jersey, and
Washington State (Cohen and Nussbaum, 2018). The Homeland Security Systems Engineering
and Development Institute (HSSEDI) undertook a series of state case studies, on behalf of the
National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) that looked at cyber governance, including much overlap with how
this analysis would define it (although with other things included). The DHS-NASCIO MITRE
report also known as State Cybersecurity Governance Case Studies looked at trends to include:
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strategy and planning, budget and acquisition, risk identification and mitigation, incident
response, information sharing, workforce and education, and proactive leadership. Other trends
looked at engagement of private sector, focus on local government priorities, and a centralized
multi-stakeholder approach (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 2017).
Authority is needed to set strategy and formal mechanisms are needed to adapt to strategy
in all trends. The MITRE report also said it was important to identify and set definitions of
incidents, authorities, and responsibilities. It is important to have formal governance mechanisms
in place to get the private and public sector partners involved in the process. Strategies should be
long-term and transcend administrations and engage stakeholders beyond IT, across different
agencies and branches of government (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 2017).
Other possible factors outside of the NASCIO document include the adoption of a framework,
identifying a leadership “champion,” individual agency empowerment in the context of overall
strategy, and integration with an organization’s risk management operations.
State Cybersecurity Governance Case Studies looked at Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey,
Virginia, and Washington State’s governance programs and initiatives. Of particular interest for
this study are the models being used by each respective state, level of legislative involvement in
the governance model, perceived success of each state’s governance model, levels of innovation,
and levels of effort put forth in each state. This review will further emphasize which model, if
any is the most successful in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, and whether or not level of
legislative or governor involvement leads to more success and easier implementation across the
board. It will also help to identify key components of each model (centralized, decentralized, and
hybrid).
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Georgia. The state’s cybersecurity programs are governed through a unified and
coordinated approach across the executive branch. There are tangible laws in place with the
centralized authority for technology being the Georgia Technology Authority (GTA). The
governor is highly involved in cybersecurity issues and utilizes many different mechanisms to
create sharing of information across government and public and private sectors. The state has
created the Hull McKnight Georgia Cyber Innovation and Training Center and has seen an
increase in the cyber workforce as a result (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency,
2017, pp. A1-A25).
Michigan. Michigan uses a centralized/unified and coordinated approach and has five
cyber councils that make up their cybersecurity governing body. This allows the state to be
adaptable and agile with cybersecurity risk and assessments. Legislation is not the foundation of
the cybersecurity governance framework, though the state does have a strategic cyber plan in
place. Michigan utilizes the Merit Network to address cyber workforce gaps, focusing on
civilians. The overall cybersecurity focus is on the entire state of Michigan, rather than
segregating out the “government.” The Chief Information Officer for the state shares information
across industries, and there is collaboration between different entities. The governor is heavily
involved in cybersecurity. The state also employs CISO as a Service (shared service) and
recognizes that it may not be cost effective to have multiple CISOs within the state and local
governments. According to this case study, the significance of Michigan’s centralized approach
to cybersecurity governance is that it introduces a new way of thinking – thinking outside of the
“government” box and has a cross ecosystem governance approach to incident response
(Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 2017, pp. B1-B25).
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New Jersey. The state uses a hybrid approach to cybersecurity governance, though there
is centralization for the IT acquisition process. In 2007, a law was passed that consolidated IT
services across the executive branch agencies into one agency, the Office of Information
Technology (OIT). An executive order established the New Jersey Cybersecurity &
Communication Integration Cell (NJCCIC) – a centralized civilian body to “coordinate
cybersecurity information sharing, perform cybersecurity threat analysis, and promote shared and
situational awareness between and among the public and private sectors,” (Cybersecurity &
Infrastructure Security Agency, 2017, pp. C1-C25). It is part of the New Jersey Homeland
Security and Preparedness Office. The CISO serves a Homeland Security function, and governs
cybersecurity as an enterprise-wide strategic issue across government and public and private
sectors. The state has multiple information sharing entities (such as the Financial ISAC) and
partners with SANS to address cyber education gaps (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security
Agency, 2017, pp. C1-C25).
Virginia. Virginia operates cybersecurity in a very centralized approach. All branches of
the government are involved, and they utilize the Virginia State Police as the lead agency for
threat response. The Virginia Information Technology Agency (VITA) is in charge of
governance as stated by law under the Secretary of Technology (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure
Security Agency, 2017, pp. D1-D25).
Washington. The state utilizes a hybrid approach to cybersecurity governance, under
legislature and law. The CIO and CISO advise state legislators and the governor’s office on a
range of cyber-related strategic issues. Current CIO Michael Cockrill notes, “technology is
involved in everything our citizens do, especially related to privacy and cybersecurity, so I spend
a lot of my time consulting with state legislators and the governor’s office about public policy
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issues related to technology and cybersecurity,” (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security
Agency, 2017, pp. E1-E25). The governance of risk is shared by the CISO and the military in the
state. It also includes public and private sector organizations and helps manage significant
incidents. The state is in the process of developing their own state, local, tribal, and territorial
(SLTT) information and sharing analysis center (ISAC) (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security
Agency, 2017, pp. E1-E25).
The closest analysis to looking at cyber governance broadly across states is work done by
the National Governors Association (NGA) in 2017. Michael Garcia, David Forscey, and
Timothy Blute of the NGA produced an interesting study of state cybersecurity that looked at all
states. While it looked at issues of cyber governance, it had a pretty strong focus on one
component of that – IT centralization (Garcia, Forscey, and Blute, 2017). Garcia and colleagues
said that “assessing the impact of cybersecurity policy requires a bottom-up flow of information
from citizens to businesses to federal government,” (Garcia et al., 2017, p. 253). The core
challenge for state cybersecurity professionals is not technical, but rather a challenge related to
cybersecurity governance (Garcia et al., 2017, p. 253). This document mentioned the three
models for governance, noting that a centralized system provides state Chief Information
Security Officers (CISOs) with the necessary authority to implement best practices and delegate
accountability (Garcia et al., 2017, p. 254). States are classified as centralized in different ways;
this includes through legal authority, leveraging the power of the governor's office, data
management, and unification of agency IT with the state’s IT agency. A centralized model can
fail if stakeholders are not engaged enough. They found that IT security centralization is a
starting point, (a launching point) to expand cybersecurity governance beyond mere networks.
They identified “degrees of centralization” by looking at six indicators for state IT: ability to

27

craft a statewide IT strategy, authority over statewide IT budget or authorization for IT projects
across the state enterprise, managerial control over IT personnel across the executive branch,
ability to implement statewide IT policies and standards, coordination of all IT activities, and
level of legislative approval (Garcia et al., 2017, p. 265). IT centralization can improve
information security and should primarily be done through a kind of cybersecurity task force,
commission, or council. These groups can be leveraged to construct the cybersecurity strategy
used to improve overall cybersecurity governance and posture.
Critique
The available literature contributes greatly to a collective understanding of state
cybersecurity efforts, state cybersecurity governance, and cybersecurity governance in general,
but there is still much more research needed before a clearer picture emerges of the “state” of
cyber governance among the states. The consensus is the same; more needs to be done, and it
needs to be continuous. Just as fast as technology changes, threats change to accommodate and
break the new technology. It is evident that there is still some disagreement on what needs to
take place to thwart and prevent cyber-attacks, and who needs to be involved. There is a need for
collaboration, and there are many different types of regimes. This is to be expected, though, as
different entities have different needs. A small organization with five employees that sells
stationary is not going to have the same cybersecurity needs as the World Bank, for example.
Conclusion
Internet and cyber governance have become strategic issues where political, economic,
and social stakes meet. It is ever-changing, and the need is substantial. Phishing, cloning, identity
theft, and stealing passwords are just a few of the ways that cybercriminals are compromising
organizations and government entities. The levels and types of threats criminals are using are
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ever-changing because of changes and advances in technology. Research has shown that
collaboration is a powerful tool in cyber defense, but it too must change constantly with
advances in technology and the invention and introduction of new threats.
The Center for Internet Security is a major player in the cyber defense schema. They are
trusted world-wide and have developed 100+ Benchmarks across 14 different technology groups
that serve as configuration guidelines to safeguard systems against cyber threats. The CIS
Benchmarks and CIS Controls are recognized as the global standard and best practices for
securing IT systems and data against the most pervasive attacks (CIS, 2019). Their guidelines are
collaboratively refined and verified by a global community of IT professionals that volunteer
their time to the effort.
Leadership and authority within cybersecurity collaborative efforts needs more research
and examination. Cybersecurity studies are often oriented to solving policy problems at the
expense of theory-building and methodological innovation. Studies have found that
cybersecurity is undermined by vulnerabilities in products and systems. Failure to heed experts is
a major source of vulnerability. Failure to heed experts is a known problem in technology.
Collaboratively, these issues need to be addressed to improve cybersecurity defense and to
eliminate and overcome barriers. This study aims to fill the gaps in today’s literature and theory
by introducing cybersecurity governance initiatives, interest-based (risk-based) problem-solving
and conflict resolution techniques, and different models (centralized, decentralized, and hybrid)
created around a state’s needs.
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods
Introduction
When it comes to cybersecurity governance programs, state leaders are tasked with a lot
to ensure that their state and state agencies are protected and able to thwart pervasive cyber
threats and attacks; however, they cannot do it alone. Generally, state leaders (governor’s and
legislatures) have someone in charge of their cybersecurity and IT governance programs that
report back to them, and are responsible for implementing the governance structures. The annual
Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) has documented that most state and local
organizations are assessed below the recommended minimum grade for cybersecurity (MSISAC, 2018, p. 2). Moreover, most states have made limited progress in improving their
cybersecurity resiliency. Surveys of Chief Information Officers (CIOs), Chief Information
Security Officers (CISOs), and other individuals responsible for cybersecurity in their state have
identified (via the NCSR) that weak IT and cybersecurity governance, often resulting from
diffused authority and complex organization structures, is a significant contributor to the slow
progress in improving their state’s cybersecurity posture (MS-ISAC, 2018, p. 2).
Approach
This study uses a positivist approach. It is believed that a positivist approach is the best
way to handle the data collection in this research because the study will be looking at the
regularities and correlation between different elements. It will also involve summarizing
identified patterns into generalized findings. “A positivist perspective privileges the researcher as
the authority in the research process due to his or her objective, value-neutral stance, and his or
her use of standardized measurement instruments,” (Hesse-Biber, 2017, p. 6). This approach
assigns direct roles to the researcher and the participants in the study, and seeks to find out the
truth. In the case of this study, the use of a positivist approach helps answer the research
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question: Is a centralized cybersecurity governance model the most successful (effective and
efficient) framework and can this model/framework be successfully implemented at the state
level? It also helps identify patterns between the different governance models (centralized,
decentralized, and hybrid), and levels of success and/or efficiency. To study the cybersecurity
governance process, previous NCSR data was utilized to see if quantitatively, there is a
correlation between higher NCSR scores and the model implemented by the state. Higher scores
mean more successful cybersecurity programs. This is the primary quantitative data. Using a
positivist approach, the researcher must remain objective and not allow values and/or biases to
affect the research (Hesse-Biber, 2017, p. 12). Analysis of the NCSR data allowed for a
deductive mode of inquiry and tested the hypothesis that states with centralized authority over
cybersecurity governance will have higher NCSR scores (higher scores = more successful
cybersecurity programs) than states that utilize a decentralized or hybrid model. Using a
positivist approach, it is clear (both quantitatively and qualitatively) that patterned relationships
exist.
Twelve telephone interviews (primary qualitative data) were conducted with leaders
responsible for implementing cybersecurity governance initiatives for their states. From a
positivist perspective, the interviews offered a more personal understanding of the state’s stance
on cybersecurity governance and level of governor/legislature involvement. The interviews also
answered questions about the conditions, decisions, and actions that led to the successful (or
unsuccessful) design, implementation, and ongoing use of cybersecurity governance at the state
level. Sticking to a set of primary questions and follow-on questions allowed the research to be
conducted in an unbiased manner as answers were recorded based on previously identified
patterns per governance model.
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Participant Sample
The sample for part of this study includes analysis and data from a past Nationwide
Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) assessment (2018); representatives (CIOs, CISOs, and state
leaders) from 43 states and 342 state agencies answered questions via survey about their
cybersecurity governance models. Another aspect of the study on cybersecurity governance
models comes in the way of interviews to answer the research question: Is a centralized
cybersecurity governance model the most successful (effective and efficient) framework and can
this model/framework be successfully implemented at the state level? A team, made up of
personnel from the Center for Internet Security (CIS), the Center for Technology in Government
(CTG) at the University of Albany, State University of New York, and myself (collaboratively)
identified 15 candidate states for a study on collaborative cybersecurity governance and the
effectiveness of collaborative cybersecurity governance at the state level. The 15 states included:
1. Georgia
2. Tennessee
3. Washington
4. North Dakota
5. Texas
6. Virginia
7. New Jersey
8. Colorado
9. Illinois
10. Michigan
11. Hawaii
12. Mississippi
13. Vermont
14. Florida
15. North Carolina
From CIS, five states were chosen from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
study that did not draw conclusions on how the governance models worked. North Dakota was
selected because of the recent ‘buzz’ regarding their holistic approach to cybersecurity
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governance. Texas was selected as the CIO sits on the CIS Board. Three candidate states were
suggested by the CIS Security Operations Center manager. The remaining five states were noted
by CIS staff for responsiveness and their varied approaches to governance. NCSR data and
scores were not used to choose the candidates.
Eleven of the candidate states agreed to participate in the study: Florida (decentralized),
Tennessee (centralized), North Dakota (centralized), New Jersey (hybrid), Texas (decentralized),
Virginia (centralized), Illinois (centralized), Michigan (centralized), Hawaii (hybrid), Mississippi
(decentralized), and North Carolina (decentralized). New Hampshire (hybrid) also agreed to
participate, though they were not on the initial candidate list. For the states interviewed (per the
NCSR data), five are centralized, five are hybrid, and two are decentralized. However, some of
the answers received during the interviews contradicted the data obtained from the NCSR. Per
the interviews, five states identified as centralized, four as decentralized, and three as hybrid.
Concepts
In order to answer the research question: Is a centralized cybersecurity governance model
the most successful (effective and efficient) framework and can this model/framework be
successfully implemented at the state level?, it is important to define the concepts that make up
the research question. According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, cybersecurity is defined as
“measures taken to protect a computer or computer system against unauthorized attack,”
(Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Emerson and Nabatchi define governance as the “act of governing, or
how actors use processes and make decisions to exercise authority and control, grant power, take
action, and ensure performance—all of which are guided by the sets of principles, roles, and
procedures around which actors converge,” (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 230).
“Cybersecurity governance is the process through which humans understand organizational risk,
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prioritize resources, and establish procedures to erect technical defenses against computer-based
attacks,” (Garcia, Forscey, and Blute, 2017, p. 254). Cybersecurity governance defines priorities,
processes, metrics, tolerances, and implementation methods. It is codified in law and/or
executive orders and provides a framework for written policies and procedures; cybersecurity
governance integrates with, and reflects the structure of the state’s overall IT governance.
The study looked at three cybersecurity governance models: centralized, decentralized,
and hybrid. Per the NCSR and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a
centralized governance structure is defined as one where information security governance/policy
authority and decision-making powers are vested solely within a central body (MS-ISAC, 2018).
In a decentralized structure, those powers are distributed to individual sub-organizations. Hybrid
governance structures are a mix between both central body and individual sub-organizations
having information security governance authority (MS-ISAC, 2018). These definitions are used
extensively throughout the rest of this dissertation to describe centralized, decentralized, and
hybrid models of cybersecurity governance. For the purpose of this research study, the word
“framework” can be used interchangeably with the word “model”; cybersecurity governance
framework and cybersecurity governance model have the same meaning.
Operationalization: Quantitative Analysis
The study employed a quantitative research design with three independent variables
(centralized, decentralized, and hybrid governance models) and one independent variable (NCSR
score). The main purpose of the study was to investigate how the independent variables were
related to levels of scores as reported by each state on the Nationwide Cybersecurity Review
(NCSR). The higher the score, the higher the success of the cybersecurity governance model.
Success is measured by efficiency and effectiveness of the cybersecurity governance models.
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Success is further amplified and measured by the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework (CSF): identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. The NCSR data measures the
effectiveness and efficiency (success or lack thereof) of each state and state agency’s
cybersecurity governance programs. When answering the survey questions for the NCSR, state
representatives ranked their current programs on a Likert scale from one to seven, where one
equals “not performed”; two equals “informally done”; three equals “partially documented”; four
equals “documented policy”; five equals “implementation in process”; six equals “tested and
verified”; and, seven equals “optimized.” Higher scores reflect mature and effective
cybersecurity programs.
The NCSR is a no-cost, annual self-assessment designed to measure gaps and capabilities
of state, local, tribal, and territorial governments’ cybersecurity programs (MS-ISAC, 2018). The
NCSR is based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework
(NIST CSF), and is sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the MultiState Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) (CIS, 2019). It provides actionable
feedback and metrics, and evaluates cybersecurity maturity across the nation. All states (and
agencies), local governments (and departments), tribal nations, and territorial governments can
participate. This data was chosen as the NCSR is a well-respected and well-known survey in the
field of cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance. The data is valid and reliable. The survey
will help answer the research question: Is a centralized cybersecurity governance model the most
successful (effective and efficient) framework and can this model/framework be successfully
implemented at the state level? The data and findings should also test the hypothesis that states
with centralized authority over cybersecurity governance will have higher NCSR scores (higher
scores = more successful cybersecurity programs) than states that utilize a decentralized or
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hybrid model. The following initial questions were asked of participants on the NCSR (via
structured response format survey):
1. How would you categorize your cybersecurity governance structure?
•

Centralized – Information security governance/policy authority and decisionmaking powers are vested solely within a central body

•

Decentralized – Information security governance/policy authority and decisionmaking powers are distributed to individual sub-organizations

•

Hybrid – Information security governance/policy authority and decision-making
is distributed between a central body and individual sub-organizations

2. How would you categorize your cybersecurity implementation and operations?
•

Centralized – Information security governance/policy authority and decisionmaking powers are vested solely within a central body

•

Decentralized – Information security governance/policy authority and decisionmaking powers are distributed to individual sub-organizations

•

Hybrid – Information security governance/policy authority and decision-making
is distributed between a central body and individual sub-organizations

3. Who are you answering the NCSR on behalf of?
•

Your organization only

•

Your organization and subordinate organization

•

Other (please specify)

The initial questions were followed by more specific questions related to cybersecurity
maturity of their state’s governance frameworks based on the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework’s five functions. The five functions included in
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) are: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.
The 43 states that participated in the NCSR answered survey questions related to cybersecurity
governance and these five functions. The five functions represent the five primary pillars for a
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successful and holistic cybersecurity program (NIST, 2018). As related to cybersecurity
governance at the state and state agency level, the functions help leaders to express the
management of their cybersecurity risk at high levels and aid in the risk decision-making
process.
The “identify” function helps leaders develop an organizational understanding to
managing cybersecurity risk. These risks can affect systems, people, assets, data, and
capabilities. It is important to understand business context, resources that support critical
functions, and the related cybersecurity risks; this allows decision-makers at the state and state
agency level to focus and prioritize their efforts (NIST, 2018). Within this function, leaders can
identify physical and software assets within the organization and hence start an asset
management program. They can also identify the organization’s role in critical infrastructure and
identify cybersecurity policies identified within the organization to define governance programs,
and legal and regulatory requirements regarding the organization’s cybersecurity capabilities
(NIST, 2018). It is in the “identify” function where vulnerabilities and internal and external
threats can be assessed. Survey takers self-reported “identify” scores through categories of asset
management (ID-AM), business environment (ID-BE), governance (ID-GV), risk assessment
(ID-RA), risk management strategy (ID-RM), and supply chain risk management (ID-RM).
The next function, “protect,” looks at appropriate safeguards and supports the ability to
limit or contain the effects of a possible cybersecurity event. It offers protection for identity
management and access control, and empowers staff through awareness and training. The
“protect” function also establishes data security protection to safeguard an organization’s
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, and allows an organization to
implement information protection processes and procedures (NIST, 2018). Organizations at the
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state and state agency level can protect their resources through maintenance and manage
protective technology to ensure their systems and security are compliant with policies,
procedures, and agreements. The “protect” scores include categories of identity management and
access control (PR-AC), awareness and training (PR-AT), data security (PR-DS), information
protection processes and procedures (PR-IP), maintenance (PR-MA), and protective technology
(PR-PT).
The “detect” function defines the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a
cybersecurity event (NIST, 2018). This function allows cybersecurity events to be discovered in
a timely manner, and the potential impact to be understood. Organizations should implement
continuous security monitoring to verify the effectiveness of the protective measures that are in
place. Individual self-reported “detect” scores are broken down into categories of anomalies and
events (DE-AE), security continuous monitoring (DE-CM), and detection processes (DE-DP).
The fourth NIST CSF function is “respond.” This function includes activities the
organization must act on in regard to a cybersecurity incident. It gives the organization the
support to contain the impact of the potential cybersecurity threat. The “respond” function
ensures that response planning processes are in place and executed appropriately during and after
an event. Leaders should communicate with stakeholders, law enforcement, and external
stakeholders during this phase as appropriate. The organization will analyze their response and
support recovery activities; mitigation activities are performed to prevent a future event and
resolve the current situation. The organization should discuss improvements to their response
plan by incorporating lessons learned from current and previous events. “Respond” scores
include categories of response planning (RS-RP), communications (RS-CO), analysis (RS-AN),
mitigation (RS-MI), and improvements (RS-IM).
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The final function, the “recover” function, identifies appropriate activities to maintain
plans for resiliency; it also gives the organization the opportunity to restore any capabilities or
services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event (NIST, 2018). The “recover” function
reduces the impact to the organization and allows the organization to implement recovery
planning processes and procedures. The organization can improve upon its processes and
procedures based on lessons learned. Recovery planning (RC-RP), improvements (RC-IM), and
communications (RC-CO) comprise “recover” averages on the NCSR.
The NIST CSF’s five functions (identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover) all
directly relate to cybersecurity governance. The functions are “must haves” for a successful and
holistic cybersecurity program (NIST, 2018). A critical role of cybersecurity governance is to
ensure that discussions about risk and risk response, in terms of state-level policy and strategy,
are taking place and that those discussions are leading to actions designed to manage risk.
The state’s representatives that participated in the 2018 NCSR answered additional
questions through self-reporting, related to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework’s five functions
of identify (ID), protect (PR), detect (DE), respond (RS), and recover (RC) as they relate to
cybersecurity governance. There are 108 additional subcategories, which are outcome driven
statements for creating or improving a cybersecurity program. NCSR participants self-reported
their rankings in each category and subcategory on a Likert scale from one to seven. Table 1
identifies the 23 NIST CSF categories per function.
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Table 1
NIST Cybersecurity Framework Categories
Function
Category
Identify
Asset Management
Business Environment
Governance
Risk Assessment
Risk Management Strategy
Supply Chain Risk Management

ID
ID.AM
ID.BE
ID.GV
ID.RA
ID.RM
ID.SC

Protect

Identity Mgmt./Access Control
Awareness and Training
Data Security
Information Protection Process & Procedure
Maintenance
Protective Technology

PR.AC
PR.AT
PR.DS
PR.IP
PR.MA
PR.PT

Detect

Anomalies and Events
Security Continuous Monitoring
Detection Processes

DE.AE
DE.CM
DE.DP

Respond

Response Planning
Communications
Analysis
Mitigation
Improvements

RS.RP
RS.CO
RS.AN
RS.MI
RS.IM

Recover

Recovery Planning
Improvements
Communications

RC.RP
RC.IM
RC.CO

Note. Adapted from “Cybersecurity Framework: The five functions,” by NIST, (2018, July 25).
Retrieved from https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/online-learning/five-functions
The study looked at average NCSR scores in each category (including subcategories) and
also looked at Total Average (of all average category scores). A completely optimal
cybersecurity program is a seven; for the purpose of this study, a four and up average NCSR
score is considered heading in the right direction and successful (4 = documented policy, 5 =
implementation in process, 6 = tested and verified). Higher NCSR scores should be seen in states
that exercise a centralized cybersecurity governance model.
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Continuous Governance
In establishing an effective framework and governance capabilities, a team comprised of
members from the Center for Internet Security (CIS) and the Center for Technology in
Government (CTG) at the University of Albany, State University of New York, have identified
five steps in the continuous governance process to include, the who, the authority, the scope,
process, and feedback. “Who” includes those involved and also those affected by the
governance. “Authority” is the who and the information that is needed to use the authority;
“scope” is the application of the authority; “process” are the controls in place; and, “feedback”
measures the controls and makes sure they are working. “Feedback” is sent back to the “who” to
provide for continuous assessments.

Figure 1. Continuous Governance Process developed by CIS/CTG governance project team.
Building upon the who, authority, scope, process, and feedback are the core components
of governance, again identified by CIS and CTG for the purpose of this study. The components
are strategic vision, which includes the who, authority, and scope; effectiveness/efficiency
includes process and feedback; transparency is the feedback, who, and authority; accountability
includes the who, authority, and scope; responsiveness is process and feedback; and, awareness
encompasses everything – who authority, scope, process, and feedback.
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Figure 2. Core Components of Governance as defined by CIS/CTG governance project team.
The aforementioned DHS report, State Cybersecurity Governance Case Studies was used
as a starting point for the qualitative research and to potentially identify candidate states for
cybersecurity governance related interviews. The study looked at Georgia, Michigan, New
Jersey, Virginia, and Washington State’s governance programs and initiatives. The different
cybersecurity governance models (centralized, decentralized, and hybrid) were identified in the
case study by state. Besides cybersecurity governance model used, other items per state were
considered in the evaluation, including level of legislative involvement, perceived success of
each state’s governance model, levels of innovation, and levels of effort put forth in each state.
These items were written out with brief descriptions and the team members were allowed to do
additional research into the program areas. After evaluating the five states in the DHS case study,
the four team members rated each item of the core components of governance (strategic vision,
effectiveness/efficiency, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and awareness) as defined
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by CIS and CTG for each state on a Likert scale of one to five, with five being the highest
(Figure 2). Much like the Likert scores of the NCSR, scores were similarly distributed:
1 = not present; little or none (unsuccessful)
2 = plans partially in place
3 = in progress; making strides
4 = plans in place and progress being made; room for improvement
5 = optimized; fully implemented successful plans in place (successful)
These ratings were applied on perception of success per the core components of
governance for each state, dependent upon model used. CIS governance project team members
individually rated the states and their initiatives in the DHS case study highlighting and
discussing specific programs. Each team member assigned values for all components for all
states; individual scores in each category were then averaged and appear in Table 2. The scores
served as a means of identifying potential states to interview ONLY. They were further
examined in conjunction with data acquired later in the study to see if these perceptions matched
data acquired in individual interviews with state cybersecurity leaders and quantitative data
perused in the NCSR.
Concepts/Operationalization: Qualitative Analysis
The same components were used when analyzing the interview data to identify
correlations between “success” and cybersecurity governance model used, senior leadership
involvement, actions taken by states to increase cybersecurity, and scope of the state’s
cybersecurity programs. Twelve interviews were conducted over the telephone at the Center for
Internet Security (CIS), by myself and members of CIS and CTG. All team members were
present for all 12 interviews. The interviews were recorded and transcribed in WebEx, allowing
for easy extraction of the data. The location did not influence the nature of the interviews, though
it should be noted that CIS’s sponsorship probably prompted the interviewees to say “yes” to
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being interviewed. There were no real challenges with these interviews, other than setting up
time to conduct them. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, following a
set of questions (Appendix B) similar to questions asked on the NCSR; however, there was room
to deviate from said questions to ask follow-on questions depending on answers received. This is
what made the interviews necessary and different from the NCSR (that uses a Likert scale). A
list of questions (in a checklist format) were compiled prior to the interviews that included
appropriate follow-on questions. Open-ended questions allowed the participants to elaborate and
offer explanations. As each question was asked and subsequently answered, the answers were
recorded (written) on the checklist.
After going through each individual transcription of the 12 state interviews, answers were
categorized by common themes (repetitive or patterned relationships between identified
elements), and frequencies were tallied through a simple frequency count by category/theme
(Bazeley, 2013, p. 192). Frequency refers to the number of times an event occurs. Common
themes included: cybersecurity governance model used, senior leadership involvement, success
or failure as reported by state representative, scope (private sector, local government, and/or
individuals), benefits of cybersecurity governance, etc. Particular attention was paid to the
cybersecurity governance model used, perceived success, and senior leadership involvement
(since this study is looking at cybersecurity governance implemented at the state level
(governor’s office)). The frequency tabulations were used to account for number of states and
their relationship to each theme. The frequency count data was compared (in a side by side
analysis) to data from the NCSR for each of the 12 states. Comparatively, it was used to identify
differences in answers between the states’ answers on the NCSR and the interviews. There were
many questions that could not be checked off or tallied because the answers were more
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descriptive in nature. For example, one of the questions was “in your opinion, is your state’s
approach to cybersecurity governance a success?” This answer could be tallied with a yes or no.
However, the rest of the question asks “Why or why not? In what way?” Another question asked
participants “what is the number one action you would recommend to any governor or other
senior executive seeking to increase cybersecurity governance and cyber resiliency in their
state?” A list of answers (some had crossover) and themes was compiled and used in the study as
potential recommendations for initiating a collaborative cybersecurity governance framework at
the state level.
Though not all answers matched the NCSR results in terms of governance model used,
the interviews created a clear picture of each state’s priorities as related to cybersecurity. The
analysis further helped test the hypothesis and answer the research question, while also offering a
personal perspective as to why and how certain initiatives are shaping each individual state’s
cybersecurity governance programs.
Evaluation of Assumptions
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was chosen in this study as it examines
“differences between groups with regard to one continuous dependent variable,” (Abu-Bader,
2016, p. 11). The one-way ANOVA allows researchers to compare mean differences among two
or more independent groups to determine statistical significance or lack thereof. This
cybersecurity governance study examined whether there was an overall significant difference
between the independent variables (model: centralized, decentralized, hybrid) with regard to
(higher) NCSR score (dependent variable). Prior to conducting the analysis, the ANOVA
assumptions of normality and homogeneity were also examined. The dependent variable (NCSR
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score) was normally distributed among the sample size, and the variance of the dependent
variable was equally distributed.
Five different one-way ANOVAs were run comparing the averages of the five NCSR
function scores (identify (ID), protect (PR), detect (DE), respond (RS), and recover (RC)) of
centralized, decentralized, and hybrid cybersecurity governance models. The five functions
represent the five primary pillars for a successful and holistic cybersecurity program (NIST,
2018). If a significant difference was detected in the one-way ANOVA of the five NCSR
function scores, a post hoc Tukey test was run to statistically compare each pair of groups
(centralized/decentralized, centralized/hybrid, decentralized/hybrid) separately on the dependent
variable of NCSR score. The post hoc test determines where differences exist.

46

Chapter 4: Findings
Case Study Analysis
Looking at Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington State’s governance
programs and initiatives as identified in State Cybersecurity Governance Case Studies, the CIS
governance project team, comprised of four members, rated the five states on a Likert scale from
one to five on each of the core components of governance: strategic vision, effectiveness and
efficiency, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and awareness. For the purpose of this
case study analysis, 1= not present/little or none (unsuccessful); 2 = plans partially in place; 3 =
in progress/making strides; 4 = plans in place and progress being made/room for improvement;
and, 5 = optimized/fully implemented successful plans in place (successful).
Table 2
Case Study Analysis of Core Components of Governance by CIS
GA
MI
NJ
Strategic
Vision

VA

WA

3.5

4

4

5

4

Effectiveness /
Efficiency

4

5

4

4

4

Transparency

4

4

3.5

4

4

Accountability

4

5

3

5

4

Responsiveness

4

4.5

3

4

4.5

Awareness
3.9
4.5
3.5
4.4
4.1
(average of
above)
Note. Each state’s core components of governance were individually rated by four CIS
governance project team members. The scores were then averaged for each state and core
component. The scores served as a means of identifying potential states to interview only.
The team paid particular attention to cybersecurity governance models (centralized,
decentralized, and hybrid) used by each state, legislative involvement, perceived success of each
state’s governance model, levels of innovation, and levels of effort put forth as mentioned in the
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case studies to rate each of the core components. Each team member assigned values for all
components for all states; individual scores in each category were then averaged. While only
based on individual team perception and the perception of the author of the DHS case study, the
five states (Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington) were deemed to be using
successful governance models, having above average scores in the core components of
governance. Above average scores in this instance were 3.5 or higher; all five states achieved
this. These states were added to the list of potential interviewees (to be interviewed by the
governance project team) to examine successful (effective and efficient) governance models at
the state level.
NCSR Data
Per the Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), a centralized governance structure is defined as one where
information security governance/policy authority and decision-making powers are vested solely
within a central body (MS-ISAC, 2018). In a decentralized structure, those powers are
distributed to individual sub-organizations (MS-ISAC, 2018). Hybrid governance structures are a
mix between both central body and individual sub-organizations having information security
governance authority (MS-ISAC, 2018). Forty-three states and more than 300 state agencies
answered the 2018 NCSR. Out of the 43 states reporting, 17 answered (via survey) that they
were centralized, three decentralized, and 23 were hybrid. Out of the 342 total state agencies
reporting, 176 identified as following a centralized governance model, 17 followed a
decentralized model, and 149 used a hybrid model.
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Table 3
NCSR Data – Number of Survey Participants by Governance Model
Model
State
Centralized
17
Decentralized
3
Hybrid
23
Total
43
Note. Numbers came from raw data on NCSR spreadsheet.

State Agency
176
17
149
342

The NCSR tests the cybersecurity maturity of a state’s governance framework based on
the NIST CSF’s five functions: identify (ID), protect (PR), detect (DE), respond (RS), and
recover (RC). The identify function and the protect function each have six categories, detect has
three, respond has five, and recover has three. Individual self-reported scores in each category
within each function were examined. The categories cover the breadth of cybersecurity
objectives for an organization, while not being overly detailed. They cover topics across cyber,
physical, and personnel, with a focus on business outcomes. Within each category in the
functions are subcategories that survey takers also answered questions about. Subcategories are
the deepest level of abstraction. There are 108 subcategories, which are outcome driven
statements for creating or improving a cybersecurity program. NCSR participants self-reported
their rankings in each category and subcategory on a Likert scale from one to seven:
1 = not performed
2 = informally done
3 = partially documented
4 = documented policy
5 = implementation in process
6 = tested and verified
7 = optimized
These scores and their corresponding meanings are the same for all questions on the
NCSR. The research subsequently looked at the average of each category and function. At the
state level, the 17 states that deployed a centralized cybersecurity governance model had an
average NCSR score of 5.04; the average for the three decentralized states was 3.12; and, the 23
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hybrid states averaged 4.67. State agency NCSR score averages were closer in comparison to
state averages.
Table 4
NCSR Data – Average Scores by Governance Model at the State and State Agency Level
State Average
State Agency Average
Centralized
5.04
4.82
Decentralized
3.12
4.42
Hybrid
4.67
4.68
Total
4.70
4.74
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data.
The average (self-reported) ID score for states that utilized a centralized model of
cybersecurity governance was 4.60; decentralized was 3.09; and, hybrid approaches averaged
4.24.
Table 5
Average Self-Reported Identify (ID) Scores by Governance Model
Governance Model
Number of States
Centralized
17
Decentralized
3
Hybrid
23
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data.

Average Score
4.60
3.09
4.24

Averages of protect scores were higher in both centralized models and hybrid models
(5.06 and 4.85, respectively) than those of states using a decentralized approach to governing
their cybersecurity efforts (3.06).
Table 6
Average Self-Reported Protect (PR) Scores by Governance Model
Governance Model
Number of States
Centralized
17
Decentralized
3
Hybrid
23
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data.
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Average Score
5.06
3.06
4.85

States that use centralized cyber governance models had higher averages (5.24) than
states that followed decentralized (3.05) and hybrid (4.84) models under the detect function.
Table 7
Average Self-Reported Detect (DE) Scores by Governance Model
Governance Model
Number of States
Centralized
17
Decentralized
3
Hybrid
23
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data.

Average Score
5.24
3.05
4.84

For the respond function, survey responses and NCSR scores for centralized
cybersecurity governance models were higher (5.45) than decentralized (3.05) and hybrid (4.82)
models being used.
Table 8
Average Self-Reported Respond (RS) Scores by Governance Model
Governance Model
Number of States
Centralized
17
Decentralized
3
Hybrid
23
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data.

Average Score
5.45
3.05
4.82

Finally, decentralized governance models (3.33) were lower than both centralized and
decentralized models (4.84 and 4.59, respectively) in the fifth CSF function of recover.
Table 9
Average Self-Reported Recover (RC) Scores by Governance Model
Governance Model
Number of States
Centralized
17
Decentralized
3
Hybrid
23
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data.

Average Score
4.84
3.33
4.59

One-Way ANOVAs
The one-way ANOVAs on the five NIST CSFs by cybersecurity governance model
proved the hypothesis that states with centralized authority over cybersecurity governance will
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have higher NCSR scores (higher scores = more successful cybersecurity programs) than states
that utilize a decentralized or hybrid model. However, not all of the functions individually had
significant differences between the models.
ID Function
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Identify Function does not show an overall
significant difference between the three cybersecurity governance models with regard to NCSR
scores (Table 10: F = 2.618; df = 2, 40; p > .05). No post hoc tests were run because no
significant results were detected.
Table 10
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Identify (ID) Function
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
Between Groups
6.059
2
3.030
Within Groups
46.289
40
1.157
Total
52.349
42
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level.

F
2.618

Sig
.085

PR Function
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Protect Function show an overall significant
difference between the three cybersecurity governance models with regard to NCSR scores
(Table 11.A: F = 5.181; df = 2, 40; p < .05).
The results of the post hoc Tukey HSD test (Table 11.B) of the PR function show
significant differences between the NCSR scores of states that use a centralized governance
model and those that use a decentralized model (p = .007 or p < .05). These results also show
significant differences in NCSR scores between states that use a hybrid model and those that use
a decentralized model (p = .015 or p < .05). There was no significant difference between states
that use a centralized model and those that use a hybrid approach to governing their
cybersecurity programs. States that use a decentralized cybersecurity governance model had the
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lowest PR NCSR scores (Table 11.C: mean = 3.0567), followed by states that use a hybrid model
(mean = 4.8487) and states that use a centralized model for governing their cybersecurity
programs (mean = 5.0553).
Table 11.A
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Protect (PR) Function
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
Between Groups
10.279
2
5.139
Within Groups
39.683
40
.992
Total
49.962
42
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level.

F
5.181

Sig
.010

Table 11.B
Protect (PR) Post Hoc Tukey HSD—Multiple Comparisons
95% Confidence Interval
Gov Model (I) (J) Gov Model
Mean
Std. Error
Sig.
Lower
Upper
Diff (I-J)
Bound
Bound
1 centralized 2 decentralized
1.99863*
.62374
.007
.4805
3.5168
3 hybrid
.20660
.31858
.794
-.5688
.9820
2 decentralized 1 centralized
-1.99863*
.62374
.007
-3.5168
-.4805
3 hybrid
-1.79203*
.61141
.015
-3.2802
-.3039
3 hybrid 1 centralized
-.20660
.31858
.794
-.9820
.5688
2 decentralized
1.79203*
.61141
.015
-.3039
3.2802
Note. Dependent Variable: Average PR. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. *The mean difference
is significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 11.C
Average Protect (PR) Function Descriptive Statistics
N
Mean
Std.
Std.
Dev.
Error
Centralized
17
5.0553 .84935 .20600
Decentralized
3
3.0567 2.06001 1.18935
Hybrid
23
4.8487 .94516 .19708
Total
43
4.8053 1.09067 .16633

Lower
Bound
4.6186
-2.0607
4.4400
4.4697

95% Confidence Interval
Upper
Min.
Max.
Bound
5.4920
2.95
6.16
8.1740
1.00
5.12
5.2574
2.80
6.59
5.1410
1.00
6.59

DE Function
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Detect Function show a significant difference
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between governance models with regard to NCSR scores (Table 12.A: F = 5.028; df = 2, 40; p <
.05).
The results of the post hoc Tukey HSD test (Table 12.B) of the PR function show
significant differences between the NCSR scores of states that use a centralized governance
model and those that use a decentralized model (p = .008 or p < .05). These results also show
significant differences in NCSR scores between states that use a hybrid model and those that use
a decentralized model (p = .032 or p < .05). No significant difference is found between
centralized and hybrid approaches. States that use a decentralized cybersecurity governance
model had the lowest scores (Table 12.C: mean = 3.0500), followed by states that use a hybrid
model (mean = 4.8352) and states that use a centralized cybersecurity governance model (mean
= 5.2412).
Table 12.A
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Detect (DE Function)
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
Between Groups
12.307
2
6.154
Within Groups
48.955
40
1.224
Total
61.262
42
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level.

F
5.028

Sig
.011

Table 12.B
Detect (DE) Post Hoc Tukey HSD—Multiple Comparisons
95% Confidence Interval
Gov Model (I) (J) Gov Model
Mean
Std. Error
Sig.
Lower
Upper
Diff (I-J)
Bound
Bound
1 centralized 2 decentralized
2.19118*
.69279
.008
.5050
3.8774
3 hybrid
.40596
.35384
.491
-.4553
1.2672
2 decentralized 1 centralized
-2.19118*
.69279
.008
-3.8774
-.5050
3 hybrid
-1.78522*
.67910
.032
-3.4381
-.1323
3 hybrid 1 centralized
-.40596
.35384
.491
-1.2672
.4553
2 decentralized
1.78522*
.67910
.032
.1323
3.4381
Note. Dependent Variable: Average DE. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. *The mean difference
is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 12.C
Average Detect (DE) Function Descriptive Statistics
N
Mean
Std.
Std.
Dev.
Error
Centralized
17
5.2412 .97275 .23593
Decentralized
3
3.0500 2.07545 1.19826
Hybrid
23
4.8352 1.07027 .22317
Total
43
4.8712 1.20774 .18418

Lower
Bound
4.7410
-2.1057
4.3724
4.4995

95% Confidence Interval
Upper
Min.
Max.
Bound
5.7413
2.80
6.79
8.2057
1.00
5.15
5.2980
2.03
6.24
5.2428
1.00
6.79

RS Function
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Respond Function show an overall significant
difference between the three cybersecurity governance models with regard to NCSR scores
(Table 13.A: F = 5.181; df = 2, 40; p < .05).
The results of the post hoc Tukey HSD test (Table 13.B) of the RS function show
significant differences between the NCSR scores of states that use a centralized governance
model and those that use a decentralized model (p = .009 or p < .05). No significant difference is
found between centralized and hybrid approaches and decentralized and hybrid governance
approaches under the Respond Function. States that use a decentralized cybersecurity
governance model had the lowest RS NCSR scores (Table 13.C: mean = 3.0553), followed by
states that use a hybrid model (mean = 4.8196) and states that use a centralized model for
governing their cybersecurity programs (mean = 5.4471).
Table 13.A
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Respond (RS) Function
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
Between Groups
15.382
2
7.691
Within Groups
59.381
40
1.485
Total
74.763
42
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level.
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F
5.181

Sig
.010

Table 13.B
Respond (RS) Post Hoc Tukey HSD—Multiple Comparisons
95% Confidence Interval
Gov Model (I) (J) Gov Model
Mean
Std. Error
Sig.
Lower
Upper
Diff (I-J)
Bound
Bound
1 centralized 2 decentralized
2.39373*
.76300
.009
.5367
4.2508
3 hybrid
.62749
.38970
.253
-.3210
1.5760
2 decentralized 1 centralized
-2.39373*
.76300
.009
-4.2508
-.5367
3 hybrid
-1.76623*
.74792
.059
-3.5866
.0541
3 hybrid 1 centralized
-.62749
.38970
.253
-.1.5760
.3210
2 decentralized
1.76623*
.74792
.059
-.0541
3.5866
Note. Dependent Variable: Average RS. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. *The mean difference
is significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 13.C
Average Respond (RS) Function Descriptive Statistics
N
Mean
Std.
Std.
Dev.
Error
Centralized
17
5.4471 1.05219 .25519
Decentralized
3
3.0533 2.08051 1.20118
Hybrid
23
4.8196 1.22493 .25542
Total
43
4.9444 1.33419 .20346

Lower
Bound
4.9061
-2.1149
4.2899
4.5338

95% Confidence Interval
Upper
Min.
Max.
Bound
5.9880
2.85
7.00
8.2216
1.00
5.16
5.3493
1.84
6.93
5.3550
1.00
7.00

RC Function
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Recover Function do not show an overall
significant difference between the three cybersecurity governance models with regard to NCSR
scores (Table 14: F = 1.563; df = 2, 40; p = .222 or p > .05). No post hoc tests were run because
no significant results were detected.
Table 14
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Recover (RC) Function
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
Between Groups
5.763
2
2.881
Within Groups
73.756
40
1.844
Total
79.519
42
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level.
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F
1.563

Sig
.222

There was a significant difference between NCSR scores of states that adhered to
centralized models and states that utilized decentralized models of cybersecurity governance.
There was also a significant difference between NCSR scores of states that used hybrid
approaches and those that used a decentralized model. While there was no significant difference
between centralized and hybrid cybersecurity governance models used at the state level, overall,
per each NIST (average) function score, centralized models scored the highest, followed by
hybrid models, and then decentralized models. What was not seen in the statistical analysis
(besides slightly higher scores for the centralized model) is the main difference in terms of
success (effectiveness and efficiency) between centralized and hybrid models. Since hybrid
governance structures are a mix between centralized and decentralized structures, it is safe to
assume that the hybrid model is performing close to that of the centralized model because of its
centralized tendencies. This means that ultimately, the entire cybersecurity governance structure
does not have to be centralized.
Interviews
The interviews proved beneficial as they clarified the cybersecurity governance stance of
each of the 12 states. The data did not always match up with the NCSR data; however, it did
give a personal glimpse into what each state cybersecurity leader is doing in their attempt to
initiate a collaborative cybersecurity governance framework at the state level. Using frequency
tabulations, the states were broken down by cybersecurity governance model used. Five of the
states interviewed (Tennessee, Michigan, Illinois, Virginia, and North Dakota) use a
centralized cybersecurity governance framework; four use a decentralized approach (North
Carolina, Texas, Florida, and Mississippi); three have adopted a hybrid model (New Jersey,
Hawaii, and New Hampshire). The consensus was that all of the states would like to employ a
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centralized model; however, that is not always possible because of state culture, resources and
funding, and lack of a competent workforce. The interviews found that states with close
relationships to the governor’s office had a better handle on their cybersecurity governance. All
of the centralized states had the support of senior leadership, as did most of the hybrid states.
Eight of the 12 states had senior leadership involvement. The cybersecurity governance model
used was also a contributing factor in the state cybersecurity leader’s perceived success of their
state’s cybersecurity governance model and program. Six out of 12 states believed that their
state’s cybersecurity programs are successful (all of the centralized states and one hybrid). A
few of the states came out and said that their governance programs are not successful because
of the governance model the state uses. In those instances, the interviewees said that state
culture and politics dictate their cybersecurity. The five states that use a centralized governance
structure for cybersecurity alluded to having great success, with room for improvement. (See
Appendix C for extended findings of all 12 state interviews).
The top four states with the highest NCSR scores are categorized as operating from a
centralized cybersecurity governance model. The states (Tennessee, Michigan, Illinois and
Virginia) have very little difference in their degree of centralization. All admitted to being
centralized in the interviews with some sort of central network operating throughout the state.
Note that the interviewees were not always the same person who answered the NCSR survey;
in most cases they should have been because they know the most about the governance
approaches in question. If the same person answered both the NCSR and the interviews, all
answers and cybersecurity governance models implemented at the state level should have been
consistent; that was not always the case.
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Table 15
Average NCSR Scores for States Interviewed by Governance Model (from high to low)
State
Governance
Average
Perceived
Governor/Leadership
Model
NCSR Score
Success
Involvement
Tennessee

Centralized

6.27

Y

Y

Michigan

Centralized

5.63

Y

Y

Illinois

Centralized

5.36

Y

Y

Virginia

Centralized

4.80

Y

Y

North Dakota

Centralized

4.79

Y

Y

New Jersey

Hybrid

4.44

N

N

Hawaii

Hybrid

4.41

N

Y

New Hampshire

Hybrid

4.37

Y

Y

North Carolina

Decentralized

5.50

N

Y

Texas

Decentralized

5.32

N

N

Florida

Decentralized

3.00

N

N

Mississippi

Decentralized

2.12

N

N

Average

4.67

Note. Governance model is representative of how the interviewee identified the state. Average
NCSR scores were pulled from the 2018 NCSR data.
Study Limitations
Limitations to this study include the fact that only 12 of the 50 states were represented by
cybersecurity leaders in these interviews. A larger group of interviewees might have provided
different results. Another limitation is that many of the states might not have the capability to
operate from their ideal model. This can be due to budgetary constraints, state culture, lack of
resources, etc.
Limitations may also be present in the person that answered the NCSR survey. It is not
known who ultimately answered the survey questions; it could have been answered by a state
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CISO, or it could have been someone that was assigned to answer the survey. This person might
not have a clear understanding of their state’s cybersecurity governance model. If they do not
have sufficient knowledge or authority over cybersecurity, then their answers may not be correct.
Another issue might be their definition and understanding of the term “cybersecurity
governance.” To mitigate this issue in the interviews, participants were asked what cybersecurity
governance meant to them. For the most part, there was a clear understanding, though some
states had more responsibilities and more authority over cybersecurity than others depending on
the model that was being implemented. There were a few states that answered the NCSR and the
interview question regarding governance models inconsistently. On the NCSR, North Carolina
identified as hybrid, yet the state cybersecurity representative said they are decentralized during
the interviews. North Dakota also had different data claiming to be hybrid on the NCSR and
centralized/unified in the CIS/CTG interview. New Hampshire said they were centralized on the
NCSR and hybrid on the interviews, and Mississippi claimed to be hybrid on the survey and
decentralized in the interviews. Another major limitation could be the number of questions on
the NCSR. Participants ranked their cybersecurity posture on the five NIST functions, 23
categories, and 108 subcategories. Fatigue could affect some of the results.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Threats to cybersecurity are ever-present and ever-changing; they are organizational risks
that must be managed by state leadership. While every state has cybersecurity programs (offices,
standards, guidebooks, procedures, and incident response plans), not all states have cybersecurity
governance measures in place that protect their cyber assets from threats. Essential governance
mechanisms in the form of frameworks and models are necessary for understanding and
managing cybersecurity risk; they are also important for translating awareness about cyber
threats into action. A good governance model that is implemented and supported could mean the
difference between a successful or a thwarted attack (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 5).
This dissertation examined three different cybersecurity governance models (centralized,
decentralized, and hybrid) at the state level with the purpose of answering the research question:
Is a centralized cybersecurity governance model the most successful (effective and efficient)
framework and can this model/framework be successfully implemented at the state level? This
research also aimed to test the hypothesis that states with centralized authority over cybersecurity
governance will have higher NCSR scores (higher scores = more successful cybersecurity
programs) than states that utilize a decentralized or hybrid model.
The research examined state level Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) data,
where high NCSR scores (on a one to seven-point Likert scale) represented more successful
cybersecurity programs. Forty-three states participated in the 2018 NCSR; collectively, states
that practiced centralized authority over their cybersecurity governance did have higher scores
than those that followed a decentralized or hybrid model of governance (MS-ISAC, 2018).
However, there were some exceptions and instances where a hybrid model was more effective
for some states.
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Additionally, the study compared NCSR governance data and data collected through 12
telephone interviews with individuals responsible in some way for cybersecurity in their states.
Again, the consensus was that states that had a centralized level of cybersecurity governance
deemed their programs more effective. The majority of the states acknowledged that a
centralized cybersecurity model of governance was the ideal model; however, many of the
interviewees stated that there are obstacles standing in the way of achieving centralized
governance within their state.
All 12 states helped provide a better understanding of cybersecurity governance as a
whole. While each state responded differently to most of the questions, there were major themes
across the board. From the 12 telephone interviews with state cybersecurity leadership, seven
major themes emerged: cybersecurity risks, leadership involvement (governor and legislature),
scope of authority, statutes and laws, branches of government affected by cybersecurity
governance, training and education, and budgets/procurements.
There are many risks to a state’s cybersecurity efforts. It could just be the culture or
identity of the state, or it could be that many leaders and employees do not know the risks
associated with cybersecurity. Generally, the risks are the same across the board for all states
regardless of model used. They are the things that are plaguing state agencies: ransomware,
hackers, phishing emails, etc. Some states do not have appropriate standards, or have no
consolidated view; there is no threat landscape, aggregation, or there is a lack of transparency.
There might be inadequate funding at both the state and local level which results in the lack of
basic cyber hygiene. There could simply be too many systems in place. The state of Virginia’s
(centralized) representative said that their greatest threat to cybersecurity efforts is insider threat
and access control. New Hampshire’s (hybrid) greatest cybersecurity risk is malicious code
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coming through email. New Hampshire’s cybersecurity leader said “the threat is wide and
broad.” (CIS Interviews, 2019). Under a decentralized model, Texas says keeping data
confidential is a risk they see in the state; another risk is ransomware. North Carolina sees their
greatest risks as inconsistencies and the way they defend against the cyber attacker (CIS
Interviews, 2019).
Leadership involvement is important for cybersecurity governance at the state level.
Executive buy-in and advocacy can go a long way to ensuring a cyber program is successful.
Only three of the 12 states interviewed said the governor does not support their cybersecurity
initiatives. Two of those states were hybrid and one was decentralized. The governor of North
Dakota (centralized) is a big advocate for cybersecurity initiatives having been at Microsoft
before his tenure; “he looks to reinvent government, reinvent security, reinvent cyber, and so
on,” (CIS Interviews, 2019). Many states have leadership teams from the governor down that are
dedicated to the mission of cybersecurity. Sometimes a governor can have conflicting views on
cybersecurity and different priorities than the person responsible for cybersecurity in their state,
as is the case in Hawaii where the governor is a very strong proponent of open data. The state is
opening up some of their financial systems and releasing some of the data. However, there is a
conflict because that information can be used against them (CIS Interviews, 2019).
Most states are trying to reach a “whole-of-state” governance approach, putting the
citizens first. This is bigger than IT and cybersecurity, and it is not always possible. All 12 of the
states interviewed said they would like to be able to do more for local government; however, it
does not fall within their scope of responsibility. While the State of Michigan (centralized) does
not have authority over local government, protecting and helping local government is still
important. The representative from Michigan stated that “since government is not customer
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service oriented, he has to really work hard to make ends meet.” Tennessee (centralized) has a
newly elected governor and staff, and there is an initiative to do more around cybersecurity as a
whole, including at the local level. The local government, cities, and counties are struggling right
now around cybersecurity and IT, so Tennessee is hopeful that new initiatives will be able to
bridge the gap (CIS Interviews, 2019). In North Carolina (decentralized), there is no
cybersecurity committee or governing body outside of the state CISO’s office; cybersecurity
leadership believes this would be beneficial as it would pull in various elements that are not
being taken into consideration at the time being. North Carolina would also like to have
representatives from academia, the private sector, and state and local government in a
consolidated group to help make decisions for a whole-of-state approach (CIS Interviews, 2019).
There are many ways to put citizens first – collaboratively, collectively, and
authoritatively. In order to do this, executive sponsorship is needed. The governor’s job is to
protect the state, not the state agencies. One way to do this is through statutes, laws, and
executive orders. All 12 state’s cybersecurity initiatives and programs are codified by law in
some respect; the only exception is New Hampshire where cybersecurity is not transcribed in
law, though information technology (IT) is. In New Hampshire, cybersecurity falls under IT (CIS
Interviews, 2019). With that being said, these laws generally cover the executive branch of
government only. However, in Tennessee it covers executive, judicial, and legislative branch
agencies, and in North Dakota, their seven branches of government (executive, judicial,
legislative, K-12 and higher education, city, county, and local government) are covered (CIS
Interviews, 2019).
Training and education, and the budget (lack thereof) are major themes that can stop a
cybersecurity governance program in its tracks. All 12 states have cybersecurity training
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initiatives in place; some are more complex than others. Florida (decentralized) trains cyber
professionals in state government and works closely with DHS and the National Guard on
training initiatives. Most states provide cybersecurity awareness training every year to their
employees. Educating the workforce is important, to include the sitting workforce and new
workforce that needs to be recruited – IT workforce, society, leadership, etc. In Hawaii, the
biggest issue the state is having right now is procurement and adequate staffing; neither are there
(CIS Interviews, 2019). Funding is critical and Illinois’ cybersecurity governance representative
says that the procurement cycle moves slow; it is never fast enough. Some states like Michigan
and North Dakota (both centralized) have an adequate staff and sufficient budgets; however, not
every state is so lucky. Budgeting in Mississippi is completely decentralized, and “looking at the
state as a whole, all of the individual agencies lack resources and people that are dedicated to
implementing security,” (CIS Interviews, 2019).
Through the interviews, it was discovered that governance is not necessarily well
understood and commonly defined, and that no one model is best – not centralized, not
decentralized, and not hybrid. However, centralized, decentralized, and hybrid are relevant when
talking about the executive branch; for cyber resilience of the state, this is not enough. The state
as a whole is outside of this distinction. In a perfect world, most of the state representatives
interviewed would like to have a centralized model of governance. Funding, resources,
personnel, and state culture are deterring a centralized approach in many of the states. Having
governance models in place is necessary to manage cybersecurity risk, but it is not always
sufficient. There should be governance power over procurement – meaning control over funding
and procurement, decisions about who has to meet the standards, and their roles and
responsibilities. The states interviewed said that cybersecurity governance needs to be bigger
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than the executive branch of the state government and should cover other agencies such as K-12,
local government, and nonprofits.
There are many enablers for a state’s cyber efforts. These include procurement control in
order to have effective cyber governance, control of the network, and legislation in the form of
statutes and administrative code. While the majority of the states interviewed would ideally like
to have a centralized model of governance, four of them have a federated, or decentralized model
– a model that will most likely stay that way because of state identity, local power, etc. These
states include: Florida, Mississippi, Texas, and North Carolina. The governors of each state also
face practical realities when it comes to cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance: they cannot
always hire the best and brightest; some people do not want to work in the public sector; there is
a lack of trust in the government; technology is constantly changing, as are the nature of threats
to technology; and, there is a high turnover rate of CISOs and CIOs. There may be a limited
amount of time a governor will be in power, so thinking about sustainable cybersecurity
strategies is important.
Which Model is Best?
The coupling of a central authority and decentralized, or invisible control compliance, has
allowed cybersecurity in its current state to either be a flip of a coin or wishful thinking from the
perspective of the upper legislature in government. While most states have some form of
cybersecurity governance, it often lacks sufficient power to compel compliance with the standard
policies and procedures that are required to systematically manage risks. Some states have weak
or missing authority to establish the interagency, and increasingly the intergovernmental and
inter-sectoral, agreements that are necessary to formalize collaborations.
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At the highest level, there are certain requirements that a governance program should
follow. These include:
1. Leadership and vision are communicated through the hierarchy.
2. Training and development is available for governance across all levels of state
government.
3. Collaboration – a siloed approach – has not provided the required results especially
given the need to react and respond at more granular levels within all agencies
throughout state government.
4. Cost – not only financial, but the cost of adhering to the governance framework – can
this need be justified and bought across all levels?
5. Risk appreciation – for governance to have substance, risk must be calculated and
controlled. The decisions being made should be based on an analysis of risk and
aligned to providing information across organizations in order to categorize, analyze,
and understand the risks that each level faces. If a complete appreciation of risk
across government is not known, then the cost of adherence is not attributed to the
right control cost center.
6. Feedback, in the ability to govern in this century – the requirement must be to
appreciate the risk through constant feedback. Risks in cybersecurity are constantly
changing; reaction and risk appreciation at higher levels of state government need to
react and provide the collaborative assistance to understand the need and respond in
kind.
Securing public cybersecurity systems is a complex and critical issue. Across the U.S.,
many states are investing in initiatives to address this complex problem by establishing
governance structures that ensure that cybersecurity decision-making mechanisms are welldefined and in place. These initiatives also ensure that risks to security are well understood and
approaches to reducing risks are appropriate, sufficient, and follow industry standards.
Certain aspects of cybersecurity governance at the state level should be centralized, while
some are open to fragmentation. While the most hyper centralized model may not be the ideal
framework for cybersecurity governance, there clearly is a degree of centralization that needs to
be enforced for cybersecurity, specifically so that each state governor can express their direction
67

and facilitate efficient communication with crucial stakeholders related to the success of the
state’s cybersecurity. Increased fragmentation leads to increased difficulty for security.
The results of the 2018 NCSR data analysis conclude that relatively higher scores and
averages are seen in states that practice a centralized model/framework of cybersecurity
governance, with a few exceptions. NCSR scores were significantly higher for centralized states
compared to decentralized states; and, NCSR scores were significantly higher for states that
utilized a hybrid model of cybersecurity governance as compared to a decentralized model.
There was no significant difference between centralized and hybrid cybersecurity governance
models used at the state level. Since hybrid governance structures are a mix between centralized
and decentralized structures, one can assume that the hybrid model is performing close to that of
the centralized model because of its centralized tendencies.
Most of the states interviewed in this study see a centralized model as being the ideal
cybersecurity governance model. However, there are obstacles standing in the way of
centralization. The North Carolina cybersecurity leader classified the state as very decentralized
in nature in the interviews, however they are pushing the state in a centralized direction, as they
believe it is the optimal governance structure for the state given proper resources and personnel.
Hawaii, while it wants to move towards a centralized model, currently tackles things on a more
decentralized basis due to lack of manpower and funding. Hawaii is hoping to transform the
culture surrounding cybersecurity governance in order to move in a more unified direction. The
CISO has authority to govern cybersecurity throughout the state, and this is defined in statute.
North Dakota’s unified nature of its seven branches of government or “Stage Net” approach to
cybersecurity governance pushes it into the centralized as opposed to hybrid category as
displayed in the NCSR data. The fact that one shared network provides visibility into the seven
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branches at one time enables a more centralized approach by capturing and analyzing
information coming across at that level. Texas and Florida will likely remain decentralized due
to size and political climate respectively (as stated in their interviews). They largely believe that
a decentralized approach for them will continue long into the future as other parts of their
respective government’s organization take after this approach.
Even states that say they are operating from a completely centralized approach, apply
some form of decentralization in more of a hybrid manner. The aspects that are open to
decentralization should include some common expectations/considerations that are key to
implementing an effective decentralized system that minimizes communication breakdowns and
confusion within chains of command. By taking this approach, it is fair to say that no one
governance model is “the perfect model.” Looking at different examples from the NCSR data,
the interviews conducted, and drawing the conclusion of “this is where centralization excels” and
“this is where decentralization can excel, but this is what you (governor) should put in place to
insure it does” is key to this study.
States must execute their governance to ensure they are ready to understand new threats
and plan and execute new risk management strategies. Expansion from executive level agency
assets, to a “whole of state” perspective that engages stakeholders from across levels of
government and sectors in a collaborative process of risk management is increasingly recognized
as the key to managing cybersecurity risks. This expansion does not have to happen all at once; it
may be reflected in governance that evolves from predictable and stable funding, to funding that
is commensurate to the state’s position with respect to actual measured risk. In some states, such
adaptation may mean expanding authority to controlling IT procurement; in other states it may
mean expanding the scope of authority beyond state government or building collaborations that
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lead to joint agreements about how cybersecurity threats will be managed across levels of
government and sectors. In many cases, it will lead to both. An ongoing commitment to
cybersecurity governance is critical and it must be adaptable as new threats evolve.
Cybersecurity governance at the state level should be founded on a broader, state enterprise
effort. This effort not only ensures that agencies are on the same page when responding to
incidents, but establishes a sense of cross-functionality and unity around the fact that
cybersecurity is not just a governance problem, but a public problem.

70

References
Abu-Bader, S. H. (2016). Advanced & multivariate statistical methods for social science
research. Oxford University Press.
Almeida, V., Doneda, D. & de Souza Abreu, J. (2017). Cyberwarfare and digital
governance. IEEE Internet Computing, 21(2), 68-71.
Bazeley, P. (2013). Qualitative data analysis practical strategies. Los Angeles: SAGE
Publications Inc.
Bodeau, D. J., Graubart, R., & Fabius-Greene, J. (2010, August). Improving cyber security and
mission assurance via cyber preparedness (cyber prep) levels. In 2010 IEEE Second
International Conference on Social Computing (pp. 1147-1152). IEEE.
Carr, M. (2015). Power plays in global internet governance. Millennium, 43(2), 640-659.
Cavelty, M. D. (2014). Breaking the cyber-security dilemma: Aligning security needs and
removing vulnerabilities. Science and engineering ethics, 20(3), 701-715.
CIS. (2019). CIS Benchmarks. Retrieved June 24, 2019 from
https://www.cisecurity.org/about-us/.
CIS Interviews. (2019). 12 State interviews with State Cybersecurity Leaders. Conducted the week
of September 16, 2019.
Clarke, R.A., & Knake, R.K (2010). Cyber War: The next threat to national security and what to
do about it. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Cohen, N. & Nussbaum, B. (2018) Cybersecurity for the States: Lessons from Across America.
Retrieved July 5, 2019 from https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurityinitiative/reports/cybersecurity-states-lessons-across-america/
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. (2017). State Cybersecurity Governance
Studies: Cross Site Report. Retrieved November 18, 2019 from
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cross_Site_Report_and_Case_Studi
es_508.pdf
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. (2019). Cybersecurity Governance. Retrieved
December 9, 2019 from https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/cybersecurity-governance
Deibert, R. J., & Crete-Nishihata, M. (2012). Global governance and the spread of cyberspace
controls. Global Governance, 18, 339.
DeNardis, L. (2014). The global war for internet governance. Yale University Press.

71

DeNardis, L., & Raymond, M. (2013, November). Thinking clearly about multistakeholder
internet governance. In GigaNet: Global Internet Governance Academic Network,
Annual Symposium.
Department of Justice. (2019). Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three
Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United States Political System.
Retrieved November 18, 2019 from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/grand-jury-indictsthirteen-russian-individuals-and-three-russian-companies-scheme-interfere
Emerson, K., & Nabatchi, T. (2015). Collaborative governance regimes. Georgetown University
Press.
ENISA. (2011). European Network and Information Security Agency: Good Practice Guide –
Cooperative Models for Effective Public Private Partnerships. Luxembourg: Publications
Office of the European Union.
Etzioni, A. (2011). Cybersecurity in the private sector. Issues in Science and Technology, 28(1),
58-62.
Garcia, M., Forscey, D., & Blute, T. (2017). Beyond the Network: A Holistic Perspective on
State Cybersecurity Governance. Neb. L. Rev., 96, 252.
Garcia, M., Gilligan, J., & Calkin, B. (2018). A Handbook for Elections Infrastructure Security.
Center for Internet Security.
Hesse-Biber, S. N. (2017). The practice of qualitative research: engaging students in the
research process (3rd ed.). Los Angeles: SAGE.
Lewis, J., & Baker, S. (2013). The economic impact of cybercrime and cyber espionage.
McAfee.
Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Cybersecurity. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Retrieved April
21, 2020, from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cybersecurity
Miller, D. (2018). The Weakest Link: The Role of Human Error in Cybersecurity. Retrieved
July 20, 2019 from https://www.secureworldexpo.com/industry-news/weakest-linkhuman-error-in-cybersecurity
MS-ISAC. (2018). Nationwide Cybersecurity Review: 2018 Summary Report. Retrieved July
10, 2019 from https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/2018-nationwide-cybersecurityreview-ncsr-summary-report/
Murphy, T. (2010). Security challenges in the 21st century global commons. Yale J. Int'l Aff., 5,
28.

72

NIST. (2018). Cybersecurity Framework: The five functions. Retrieved on July 25, 2018 from
https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/online-learning/five-functions
Nocetti, J. (2015). Contest and conquest: Russia and global internet governance. International
Affairs, 91(1), 111-130.
Nye, J. S. (2014). The regime complex for managing global cyber activities (Vol. 1). Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University.
Nye Jr, J. S. (2017). Deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace. International security, 41(3),
44-71.
Pardo, T., Gass, S., Garcia, M., Pylant, A., De Vallance, B., & Cooke, M. (2020). Working
Draft - Managing Cyber Threats through Effective Governance: A Call to Action for
Governors and State Legislatures.
Seculore Solutions. (2019). Cyber Attack Archive. Retrieved December 5, 2019 from
https://www.seculore.com/cyber-attack-archive
Spidalieri, F. (2015). State of the States on Cybersecurity. Pell Center for International
Relations.
Trump, D. J. (2019). Executive order on America’s cybersecurity workforce.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2016). Homeland Security Advisory Council Final
Report of the Cybersecurity Subcommittee. Incidence Response – State, Local, Tribal &
Territorial. Retrieved November 18, 2019 from
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/homeland-security-advisory-council-final-reportcybersecurity-subcommittee
Vázquez, D. F., Acosta, O. P., Spirito, C., Brown, S., & Reid, E. (2012, June). Conceptual
framework for cyber defense information sharing within trust relationships. In 2012 4th
International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON 2012) (pp. 1-17). IEEE.
Verizon. (2019). 2019 Data Breach Investigations Report. Retrieved June 14, 2019 from
https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/2019-data-breach-investigationsreport.pdf

73

Appendices
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Sample Email Sent to Interview Candidate States
Cybersecurity Governance Framework Project Interview Protocol
State Interviews - Summary by State
Draft Working Document
Permission from Employer to use Data
WCU IRB Approval Letter

74

Appendix A: Sample Email Sent to Interview Candidate States
Dear XXXX,
The annual Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) has documented that most state and local
organizations are assessed below the recommended minimum grade for cybersecurity. Moreover,
most states have made slow progress in improving their cybersecurity resiliency. Surveys of state
CIOs and CISOs have identified weak IT governance as a contributing factor, often resulting
from diffused authority and complex organization structures. A number of states have addressed
this challenge through effective cybersecurity governance and can serve as reference models for
others.
The Center for Internet Security (CIS) and the Center for Technology in Government (CTG) at
the University of Albany, State University of New York, are partnering on the development of a
document for state government leaders that will draw on these leading practices. The document
will guide states in their efforts to improve their cybersecurity.
Given your experience in cybersecurity governance, we are writing to invite you to contribute to
this guidance document by participating in an interview about cybersecurity governance in your
state. Your insights regarding the drivers and foundational structure for cybersecurity governance
will ensure that the guidance document reflects the insights of leading practitioners.
We are targeting the week of September 16th to conduct the interviews. Interviews will be
conducted over the phone and last about 60 minutes.
If you are able to participate, we will work with you or your point of contact to schedule the
interview and to answer any questions you may have about the project and the interview.
Thank you in advance for considering our invitation to share your insights and experiences as we
work to inform senior executives across the country about the importance of effective
cybersecurity governance to increase cybersecurity resiliency.
Best regards,
John Gilligan
President and CEO
Center for Internet Security

Theresa A. Pardo, Ph.D.
Director
CTG UAlbany
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Appendix B: Cybersecurity Governance Framework Project Interview Protocol
Cybersecurity Governance
Project Directors:
John Gilligan, Center for Internet Security, John.Gilligan@cisecurity.org
Dr. Theresa A. Pardo, CTG UAlbany, tpardo@ctg.albany.edu

Interviews will be led by one lead participant from CIS and one from CTG UAlbany.
Introduction by CIS lead
✓ Good morning, my name is _______. I am a _______ with the Center for Internet
Security (CIS) here in East Greenbush, New York. I’m joined here by ___________.
_____ is with the Center for Technology in Government at the University at Albany, our
partner in this project.
✓ As you may recall from our invitation letter, this interview is part of a larger project
focused on creating guidance for top-level state officials on cybersecurity governance.
Our interview with you is an important component of this project as we believe the
guidance we produce will benefit greatly from your experiences and opinions. As noted
in the invitation, the interview will take up to 1 hour.
✓ Thank you for taking the time to talk with us, we are very grateful.
✓ Before we start, I’d like to review our data collection and use approach. We generally
audio record interviews so that we have a full record of the session for analysis purposes.
✓ In terms of data use, the recording from today’s interview will be kept confidential and
general findings will be presented in an aggregated way. If we want to use a direct quote
from your interview, we will contact you for approval. No information associated with
your identity will be revealed without your permission.
✓ If you agree to being recorded, we will turn on the recording now.
✓ Do you have any questions before we begin the interview?
✓ I will now turn to ___________who will lead us through the questions in the interview.
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Warm Up (WU)
First, we’re going to start by getting a little bit of information about your background and your
daily work.
WU_1. Can you give me a brief description of your job [title] and major
[responsibilities/activities]? [Note: keep this brief as time is limited. Emphasis areas bolded.]
✓ How long have you worked in the area of cybersecurity?
✓ Did you work in any other government agencies or roles before this one?
✓ Professional and education background
✓ Current position
✓ Major responsibilities
WU_2. In your opinion, what is the greatest risk to cybersecurity in your state?
Prompts

Prompts

✓ …

Current Practice (CP)
Our project aims to understand the nature of cybersecurity governance at the state level. First, we
would like to hear about how cybersecurity is governed in your state now.
CP_1. Please describe your state’s approach to governing cybersecurity. [This is the most
important question for the interview. Several of the prompts my not be covered in the
response but will be addressed in follow up questions (see bold items). Alternatively, the
follow up questions may not be necessary. ]

Prompts

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

How is accountability assigned and measured/assessed?
Involvement of top-level IT leadership and agency leadership
How is impact of cybersecurity governance determined and tracked?
What functions does governance include? [Budget, policy, technical standards,
procurement, personnel development, etc.]
Is it codified in law?
What decisions are made?
Who is involved?
Who is in charge?
Who has what authority?
What processes are used?
Limitations of the governance approach
Relationship to IT governance?
Involvement of the private sector and local government?
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CP_2. Some states have highly centralized cybersecurity governance; others have
decentralized and some have hybrid approaches. How would you describe the model that
your state uses?
Prompts

✓
✓
✓
✓

How does the (centralized, decentralized, hybrid) governance model work?
Is it documented, and can we get a copy
Why was this model implemented?
What do you perceive to be the Strengths and weaknesses of this approach for
your state?
CP_3. Can you describe how the current approach developed or evolved?
Prompts

✓ When did the current model get put in place?
✓ What were the most critical decisions that led to this approach and why was the
current approach selected?
✓ What are the benefits of the current approach over the previous approach?
✓ Whose advice, if any, did you follow in selecting this approach?

Critical Success Factors (CSFs)
In this section, I’m going to ask you a few questions about the factors that you believe have
contributed to the success or lack of success of your current approach to cybersecurity
governance. You can answer to the best of your knowledge, or just share your opinions with us.
CSF_1. What factors have been critical to your efforts to increase cybersecurity resilience in
your state?
Prompts

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Clear articulation of policy?
Strong Advocate/Executive Champion?
Clarity of Roles and responsibilities?
Who makes the most difference – individuals or specific groups?
Management?
Technology?
Key Actors?
Key Partnerships?
An incident that proved to be a catalyst?
Informal and formal leaders?
Transparency
Accountability

CSF_2. Has the scope of your cybersecurity governance contributed to your cybersecurity
resilience (that is, to what extent has your cybersecurity governance been a significant factor
in improving cybersecurity resilience)?
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Prompts

✓
✓
✓
✓

Does it include the private sector?
Does it include local governments?
Does it extend to protecting individuals?
Others?

Role of Advocates (RA)
RA_1. Who is the most influential advocate for cybersecurity in your state?
Prompts

✓ Is that person also an advocate for cybersecurity governance?

RA_2. How has this person (or persons) impacted or influenced groups such as the CISO, the
budget office, and the legislature, among other public and private organizations?
Prompts

✓ To what extent
✓ In what ways

Role of Key Actors (D)
In this section, I’m going to ask you a few questions about the role that top executives (i.e.
agency heads, CIO, you, etc.) played in your current approach to cybersecurity governance in
your state. You can answer to the best of your knowledge, or just share your opinions with us.
D_1. How have top executives in your state participated in the creation of or been impacted by
cybersecurity governance?
Prompts

✓ …

D_2. What has been the most significant action taken by your state that increased your state’s
cybersecurity?
Prompts

✓ …
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Results and Benefits (RB)
In this section, I would like to focus on the results and benefits of cybersecurity governance you
have referred to before.
RB_1. What benefits do you see from your state’s cybersecurity governance investments?
✓ Reduced?
✓ No impact?
✓ Surprises?
RB_2. What indicators do you use to track the benefits of cybersecurity governance?
Prompts

Prompts

✓

RB_3. How well is your cybersecurity governance helping your state address its most significant
cybersecurity challenges?
Prompts

✓ Areas for improvement in your approach?

RB_4. In your opinion, is your state’s approach to cybersecurity governance a success?
Prompts

✓ Why?
✓ In what way?
✓ More effective and efficient?

Recommendations for Action (RA) ****Leave at least 5 – 10 minutes at the end of interview
for these questions.
In this section, I will ask you to share your recommendations for governors and other key leaders
regarding creating/improving cybersecurity governance in their state.
RA_1. What is the # 1 action you would recommend to any governor (or other senior
executive) seeking to increase cybersecurity and cyber resiliency in their state?
Prompts

✓
✓
✓
✓

New policy?
New money?
People?
Why this action?
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Conclusion (C)
C_1. As we close out, please tell me if there is anything I should have asked you that I didn’t –
something for example, that is key or unique to your state’s cybersecurity governance
approach or successes?
Prompts

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Collaboration with local government
Collaboration with other organizations
Resources
Willingness and commitment
Timing?
…

End/Thanks
✓ Thank you. I’ll now turn it over to ____________ from CIS who will close out our
conversation.
✓ Would it be OK to follow up and clarify a few things with you in the future if necessary?
✓ Thank you very much for your time.
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Appendix C: State Interviews – Summary by State
Florida: The representative from Florida identified the state’s cybersecurity governance
model as that of a primarily decentralized model, though there are aspects that are hybrid. The
office of the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is responsible for the executive branch
agencies in a fairly decentralized model in terms of the way he manages it. The CISO advises the
governor’s office on all matters cyber, and also does a lot in terms of training cyber professionals
in state government, working closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
National Guard. The CISO’s office also manages the security operations team and data center,
which supports most of the state agencies. Engaging leadership is a challenge for Florida, as is
getting the buy-in that is needed in order to accomplish the cyber mission. Financial support is
lacking, as are the personnel that they are able to engage for cyber and state government.
Changing technology is another risk as the state is always trying to play catch up. Other risks
include ransomware and their own users clicking on links that they are not supposed to.
Local governments often reach out to the state for support and while they do not have the
formal authority over local government and are not within scope, they do try to support them
where they can. With a new governor in place now that sees the importance of cybersecurity,
helping at the local level is easier. It also gives cybersecurity leadership an easier time to present
to legislators. Florida has recently created a cyber-task force, headed by the Lieutenant Governor
and includes a lot of high-level appointees. There is a statue that speaks to the CISO’s authority
and to the authority of the department for cyber and state government, known as the Security
Act. The state also has Florida Administrative Code based on the cybersecurity framework.
The State of Florida CISO’s office engages with other state agencies on a regular basis;
each agency has an Information Security Manager who runs the agency’s security programs. In a
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decentralized model, serving on boards has broadened the scope of this role. The cyber task force
has opened up many recommendations which will likely lead to additional resources in terms of
personnel and additional statute and bills to support cyber efforts. The CISO’s office has a
recurring budget for operations, their data center, and engaging the university system; they also
have a legislative budget request every year for big ticket issues that need to be addressed over
the coming year. Florida is looking to start a centralized Security Operations Center as well. The
office of the CISO has been able to influence the administrative code related to how purchasing
is done, though is not directly involved in other agencies.
In Florida, most agencies are primarily responsible for their own IT and cyber needs,
making it a decentralized state. The CISO does have some influence over other agencies through
administrative code; representatives from the office consult with them on a regular basis.
However, being part of the conservative South affects governance as they follow the mantra “do
more with less,” (CIS Interviews, 2019). There is pretty much zero interest in increasing the
workforce, which can be problematic. Decentralization is attributed to the climate of Florida and
how Florida chooses to operate. The interviewee sees decentralization as a weakness as it comes
down to some really basic concepts. Florida is hoping to one day be more centralized and
standardized when it comes to security aspects of cyber.
Tennessee. The representative for the State of Tennessee says that the biggest threat to
cybersecurity in his state is the loss of data of the citizens and losing the competence of the
citizens that they provide services to. He wants the citizens to know what the state is doing as a
whole to protect their data. To combat that issue, they have a risk and compliance program in
place. Tennessee operates from a centralized cybersecurity governance framework and has
authority over people and policy at the enterprise level. They also have governance over
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vulnerability management, patch management, and end of life type devices. They scan all of
their servers every week through their data center, and all of the state agencies have the ability to
go in and see what their vulnerabilities look like. They also track those vulnerabilities and help
the agencies mitigate them in a timely manner. Tennessee has a lot of review processes in place
as well to ensure their governance is working. The state follows laws and mandates given to
them by the Information Systems Council.
There are limitations to Tennessee’s cyber governance structure in that they are only
looking at the executive, judicial, and legislative branch agencies. However, the state has a new
governor and staff, and there is an initiative to do more around cybersecurity as a whole
including at the local level. The interviewee says that the local government, cities, and counties
are struggling right now around cybersecurity and IT, so he is hopeful that new initiatives will be
able to bridge the gap (CIS Interviews, 2019).
There are advantage and disadvantages to Tennessee’s very centralized network. A
strength is that they are able to make changes across the board very quickly. They are able to
leverage their partnerships and write custom signatures, and then push that out to forty-thousand
devices that they manage through a centralized management tool. As far as a con, it is said that
they may not move as fast as some of the agencies want them to, and are not able to develop
solutions that they think that they have a business need for. Cost efficiency is another issue they
are dealing with especially with moving to the Cloud. The State of Tennessee has strong
executive champions and partners, and even stronger executive buy-in. They also have a
vulnerability program and applications assessments in place, along with strong security
awareness programs mandating that every state employee has cybersecurity awareness training
every year.
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North Dakota. Cybersecurity decision-makers for the State of North Dakota say the
biggest threats to cybersecurity in the state are the inconsistencies and the way they defend
against the cyber attacker. The state has seven branches of government: executive, judicial,
legislative, K-12 and higher education, city, county, and local government. They operate from a
unified (centralized) approach and have one shared network out to all of these entities across the
state. They have visibility into everything at a network level across the entire state, giving them
the ability to capture, protect, and look at the information coming across at a network layer, and
make sure that the state as a whole is protected. This makes the State of North Dakota quite
unique in respect to other state’s cyber governance initiatives. They cover 400+ entities, and
potentially those 400+ entities could have 400+ different ways of doing things. This simplifies
the process.
Recently, the state initiated a bill called Senate Bill 21-10 which gives the CISO’s office
the ability to align cybersecurity needs across all seven branches of government both from a
strategy standpoint and an operational standpoint. The governor is a big advocate for the
initiative having been at Microsoft before his tenure and wants to reinvent government, reinvent
security, reinvent cyber, and so on. Cybersecurity decisions are made by advisory boards, task
forces, and governance processes with $11.4 million dollars set aside for cyber and workforce.
The state CISO’s office collaborates to advise and oversee the other entities, giving the state a
common way of managing cybersecurity through metrics, maturity levels, etc. It is easier to
manage because the state is so small. Operational aspects can be seen as a weakness, as there is
not always buy-in at the local level. “Setting a strategy is easy; delivering on that strategy – not
so much,” (CIS Interviews, 2019). The entire state is connected; it is the clash of the new and
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old. Securing of new information is not a new problem; the unevenness in protectedness is the
problem (CIS Interviews, 2019).
While many of the states interviewed referred to North Dakota’s unified cybersecurity
governance as the ideal model, state cybersecurity leadership disagreed. He reiterated the fact
that there is no one size fits all when it comes to governance. There is a whole set of unique
characteristics across the states – need mechanisms that take advantage of culture, cost, structure
of government, etc.
New Jersey. The New Jersey Cybersecurity and Communications Integration office was
created by an executive order in 2015 to be the state’s one-stop-shop for cybersecurity,
information sharing, threat intelligence, best practices, incident reporting, and incident response.
The organization works in a public-private partnership with all organizations: small businesses,
large businesses, academia, public sector, etc. The state’s biggest risk to cybersecurity is the
whole of state approach in a highly centralized model. Previously it was hybrid, but recent
changes have made most of the state centralized. Government does not deem cybersecurity in
New Jersey as high priority, leaving some programs somewhat hybrid.
Cybersecurity for the State of New Jersey is organized under the office of Homeland
Security and Preparedness. It is not under the office of Information Technology as is the case
with other states. It is done in a holistic manner. Each major state agency has personnel that they
are responsible for and cybersecurity within that respective agency. Budgeting takes place within
those agency budgets; they are specific to the agency and not global across all agencies. Under
the Department of Homeland Security, New Jersey has a cybersecurity budget that is based on
the enterprise protective technologies that were purchased on behalf of the state. Decisions on
governance are made at the governor and board level. There is also an information security
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governance committee that is comprised of commissioners and agency heads that work on bigger
policy issues. Resources and allocations of resources are limitations here; as are increases in the
number of services, but no increases or changes to the budget. Under this plan there is no
involvement of local government of any size in how decisions, or what decisions are made.
The state has identified factors that have been critical to its efforts to increase
cybersecurity resilience: incident response, cybersecurity awareness training, reporting of
incidents, etc. Also of importance in the new centralized governance structure is that policies and
standards are impacting overall security as they are being implemented; in the past there was no
requirement for it and nobody did it. The state still has a lot of vulnerabilities that are not being
patched, but those are some of the things that they are focusing on in order to say that they are
improving. New Jersey’s representative thinks that more needs to be done on information sharing
between the states in regard to governance. This state in particular said their governance
approach is not yet a success, as they are still building the program. Success would come in the
form of understanding the risk, and being able to mitigate those risks to the best of their ability.
Texas. The Republic of Texas’s cybersecurity governance initiatives are run from a
decentralized or federated model. There are 150 state agencies and institutions of higher
education that make up the state and each has their own IT associated with it. Each organization
is responsible for their own data system and their own security. The Texas CISO and others at
the state level set policy and provide education and guidance. There is also a statewide data
center that is outsourced, so there is a security component over that as well.
Keeping data confidential is a risk in Texas; another risk is ransomware. It is mainly
happening at the local level and those at the state level are assisting with that endeavor through
training programs and a statewide incident response plan that was developed through the Texas
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Division of Emergency Management. The CISO’s office has formal authority over the 150
agencies and institutions, but engages through agreements and collaborations, and through other
legislation such as training with non-state executive agency entities. The office has no authority
over local government and there is no legislation that says they have to follow state policies; the
locals want local control.
Funding is also a big issue in Texas. Each agency is self-funded through a cooperative
contract. The Department of Information Resources provides telecommunications services to the
other organizations and they get a percentage of every purchase made; they also get a percentage
of money for use of their data center services and receive general revenue funds from the state.
In order to make changes to law, they can make recommendations to the legislature and the
legislature can change law that Texas has authority over. The agency is ultimately responsible
for the security of IT and provides assessment services, but again has no authority over
compliance; that is done with internal audits and the auditor’s office within each agency.
However, every two years they must deliver a cyber-report to the legislature based on maturity
levels of operational and security strategies.
The CISO’s office does have governance over the data center; it is a very mature
governance structure through a shared technology service. They utilize a business counsel and IQ
leadership – a leadership group at the top. From an operational perspective cyber governance is
very decentralized in the State of Texas, but with all of the boards and legislation governance is
somewhat more centralized, making it somewhat of a hybrid structure. Cybersecurity issues are
reported to a board that is appointed by the governor.
Virginia. Virginia is very unique when it comes to cybersecurity governance. Virginia
runs and maintains cybersecurity standards for the Commonwealth through a very centralized
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governance model. The Virginia Information Technology Agency (VITA) creates standards and
requirements that are built into all of Virginia’s technology services as well as those they
outsource to. In governance, VITA sets the security standards and requirements for all three
branches of government. VITA only does the enforcement in the executive branch to maintain
separation of duties, but does set the standards for everybody in Virginia. Operationally, the
office runs the security services for over 65 executive branch agencies. The office has authority
to purchase things from and communicate requirements out to vendors, and has control of
standards. VITA also has authority over what other agencies purchase and can stop an agency
from purchasing a piece of equipment if it is not compliant with their standards.
The greatest threat to Virginia cybersecurity efforts is insider threat and access control,
which according to the state representative, is being addressed on a daily basis. Virginia has not
always used a centralized model; however, in order to curb budget inefficiencies where a number
of agencies had expensive footprints for their technology, they decided to centralize it into one
single IT agency. VITA undergoes security audits every three years and performs business
impact analysis. They use a charge back model for the operational arm of cybersecurity; eight
percent of the billing from the charge back model funds the work of governance programs of the
agency. The biggest limitations are conflict of interest items which involve both risk and
operations; VITA believes that risk and operations should be separate. The only time VITA talks
to the governor’s office is when things are abnormal. Even though Virginia has centralized
control, it is important for VITA to have a good working relationship with agency Information
Security Officers. When making recommendations to other states, funding is critical and statutes
are a driving factor. States that have a better handle on their cybersecurity governance have the
governor’s ear; visibility is key (CIS Interviews, 2019).
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Illinois. A representative from the Illinois Department of Innovation and Technology
(DoIT) was interviewed for this study. In 2003, Illinois had an executive order to centralize IT.
However, this executive order did not give DoIT centralized oversight of IT as a whole. There
was a lot of arguing about authority and responsibility. The Y2K coordination helped create a set
of shared understandings and recognized the value of coordination. With a strong character in the
role of CISO, things have come together. The centralized cybersecurity governance structure has
greatly reduced the number and impact of incidents on state systems, greatly reducing the risks
through formalized processes and procedures. The state’s area of greatest outreach is elections.
They have nine elections cyber navigators that go out to local elections offices to do risk
assessments. They use NIST standards for state government and CIS Benchmarks and CIS
Controls for local governments.
State statute allows the office of the Chief Information Security Officer to focus on
implementation and makes it clear who is responsible for strategy. It depoliticizes the issues, but
still involves executive sponsorship for enforcement and for funding. The CISO’s office has
authority to shut off systems if there is a breach and agencies must comply. In this centralized
model, there is still a concern about local government. They are still looking for answers to
address local government and school districts; it is the CISO’s responsibility. Another issue with
cybersecurity governance in Illinois is that the procurement cycle moves slow, and that no matter
how fast they move, it is never fast enough. In Illinois, cybersecurity governance is a business
problem that involves state and local government and school districts. Collaboration is key, and
the impact on citizens and the private sector should be considered when making decisions. The
State of Illinois has a working relationship with the governor.
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Michigan. Previous interviewees had mentioned the successes of the State of Michigan
and how they were trying to achieve the same status by following a centralized model. The
state’s representative shared a lot of insight about the state’s centralized model and why it is so
successful. The interviewee emphasized that one of the biggest challenges is finding enterprise
solutions that meet the needs of twenty very discrete, very different customers. The office of the
CISO manages different state level agencies. The office does not have any say at the local level,
as local government is decentralized. The representative stated that “since government is not
customer service oriented, the office has to really work hard to make ends meet,” (CIS
Interviews, 2019). The State of Michigan has a leadership team from the governor down that is
dedicated to the mission of cybersecurity. Being centralized at the state level means that the
CISO has a staff and a sufficient budget that allows the office to be able to start focusing on
next-order problems. However, the interviewee thinks that the State of Michigan can do a much
better job planning, and that they should try to think as far in advance as they possibly can.
Culture was an important theme to the success of Michigan’s centralized governance model, and
it is important for the CISO’s office to be visible in the public’s eyes. While the State of
Michigan does not have authority over local government, protecting and helping local
government is still important. At the state level, cybersecurity is one of the top two or three
priorities for the governor. Executive sponsorship is important and has increased cybersecurity
resiliency for Michigan. They attribute that, and their centralized model to the success of the
governance structure.
Hawaii. Hawaii operates from a hybrid governance model, and the state representative
says the state is still trying to figure out how to make it work. There are policies in place
statewide, but they are very thin and not a single department can meet those requirements. When
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asked about the greatest risk to cybersecurity in Hawaii, the representative said it is the culture,
“culture eats strategy, eats technology” (CIS Interviews, 2019). Even with the best strategy, it is
impossible to win without changing the culture. Organizational silos between the different
branches have been difficult to break in Hawaii.
The state CISO’s office is responsible for the security and privacy related strategies; a
governance officer formally owns the rest, to include: enterprise architecture, identifying
evergreen initiatives, transforming technologies, and maintaining those technologies moving
forward. The biggest issue the state is having right now is procurement and adequate staffing.
Neither are there. Hawaii has different standards and means for IT governance and cyber
governance. The governor is a very strong proponent of open data and wants to help support the
initiative. To do that, the state is opening up some of their financial systems and releasing some
of the information. However, there is a conflict there because that information can be used
against them. Top level state officials are very involved in cybersecurity initiatives, having
named cybersecurity as one of their top seven priorities on their strategic plan.
Cybersecurity governance in the state covers the executive branch, but does not include
K-12 or higher education. The authority for cybersecurity governance is codified and in statute.
The statute states that the CISO’s office is responsible for providing the strategic direction and
governance of the executive branch, but does not go too much further into how to work with the
public and how to engage in public-private partnerships. Those areas are left to the
administrators to fulfill, and are usually done via steering committees. These committees are
comprised of nominated folks from different parts of the public and private sector. They provide
review guidance for one angle specifically wide. For cybersecurity, the steering committee is the
Information Privacy and Security Council, created because of Hawaii’s database navigation law.
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Hawaii is trying to move to a more centralized cybersecurity model, however, the process is slow
moving due to funding.
Mississippi. The State of Mississippi employs the Mississippi Department of IT Services
for their cybersecurity needs under the Enterprise Cybersecurity Program for state government. It
serves two functions: one is a governance function; the other an operational function. Under
governance, the office is responsible for developing an enterprise security policy – the minimum
requirements that an agency should implement on the security of their assets and data that they
own and support. The state operates under a hybrid approach, with a centralized network that all
agencies connect to in the telecom division. The agencies have a lot of autonomy and make their
decisions from a technology perspective. Legislation was created that started an enterprise
security program that will write and implement minimum policy requirements and standards that
agencies “should” implement. Agency heads are responsible for the security of their data and
their resources. From a budgeting perspective, it is completely decentralized. Looking at the state
as a whole, all the individual agencies – as far as state government is concerned – lack resources
and people that are dedicated to implementing security. Mississippi’s representative says “there
is also a lack of understanding and awareness at levels that you would need in order to provide
the support to get the resources that you would need,” (CIS Interviews, 2019). There are a few
agencies that have dedicated staff and they focus and do a decent job at implementing security.
But, there is a wide array of agencies that do not have the resources to implement the hygiene
layer of security that is needed.
As more and more agencies in Mississippi are moving to the Cloud, some decisions are
being made at the enterprise level. Being a decentralized model, the Mississippi Department of
IT Services does not have a very good view of the state’s posture. In order to know the posture
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for state government, one would have to have an understanding of the security posture of each
agency; that is not happening today. This limits the ability to address gaps or shortfalls that the
agency might have. A positive attribute of the decentralized model is that potentially, agencies
that have a presence and people dedicated to security can implement controls specific to their
agency in a way that helps them be more secure and carry out their missions. The governor of
Mississippi does not play a big role in cyber related issues, as most decisions go to a committee
after the Mississippi Department of IT Services addresses it. Partnerships are very important
though. The state does not work with local governments or K-12, as they are out of their
purview.
New Hampshire. Cybersecurity initiatives for the State of New Hampshire fall under the
executive branch; there are outliers that are not included in the scope of their responsibilities:
Secretary of State who is responsible for elections, and the judicial and legislative branches. The
office of the CISO is responsible for the cybersecurity posture of the state, the cybersecurity
policy, and the strategic direction. New Hampshire’s centralized governance is connected to the
centralized management of resources. However, what makes it more hybrid or decentralized are
the exceptions of operational support that they cannot provide to the agencies. There are certain
cybersecurity capabilities not under direct control, operated by other parts of the department, and
the CISO’s office provides guidance and direction to those organizations who have cyber
relevant capabilities. New Hampshire’s greatest cybersecurity risk is malicious code coming
through email; that is where they are seeing the biggest threats – phishing and malware. The
threat that comes through email is wide and broad.
Cybersecurity is part of IT governance in the state and all decisions that affect
cybersecurity are made by the governance body. The cybersecurity budget is part of the overall
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IT budget. Cybersecurity is not transcribed in law, though IT is. The main governance body, the
IT Council is currently chaired by a member of the New Hampshire National Guard, and is
represented by the top eight state agencies. There are two legislators on the Council and at least
two members from the public and private sector. The mixed body is elected to three-year terms
on the IT Council. New Hampshire also has a governance body called the Cybersecurity
Advisory Committee (CAC) that was established by an executive order (not law) by the governor
and has representatives from all agencies. This group can make recommendations and advice to
the IT Council on policies, initiatives, or direction to take in an advisory role only. The
cybersecurity leader from New Hampshire thinks the state’s approach to cybersecurity
governance is a success, and recognizes that there is always room for improvement. It is an
approach that is very dependent on having the right people and the right outreach.
North Carolina. North Carolina’s Department of Enterprise Security Risk Management
handles cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance in the state. The role of the department is to
provide governance for the security program for the state, providing incident response and
vulnerability assessment project reviews. These are core subjects found within a security
program. The Department of Enterprise Security Risk Management has identified a lot of
deficiencies within the state and in the counties. Funding is an issue for the state, as are
resources. The department looks to support a statewide approach to cyber and is looking for
ways to fund the smaller counties and municipalities. The interviewee hopes for a holistic
cybersecurity governance approach in the state because state data does not just sit within the
executive agencies. “If we’re not protecting them, we’re not protecting us,” (CIS Interviews,
2019).
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Legislatively, the office has a broad state reach and has control and governance of the
executive branch agencies. The state is mainly decentralized; however, parts are consolidated.
The office has been legislatively mandated and there are participating agencies that have been
consolidated within. However, some portions of these executive branch agencies have been able
to receive exceptions. The State of North Carolina’s cybersecurity programs have accountability
assigned and measured/assessed through statutes that speak to the need annually for assessments
to be conducted by the agencies; that report is provided to the legislative oversight committee on
an annual basis. They leverage that to create the continuous monitoring program on a three-year
cycle, taking a data centric approach to cyber. The Department of Enterprise Security Risk
Management has oversight of state data in the state agencies. They also have approval authority
of where the data can sit and how it will be protected while it is there.
Cybersecurity governance in the State of North Carolina covers the budget and includes
policy and technical standards and personnel. The office generates the statewide cybersecurity
policy and is in the process of deploying enterprise scanning; from a vulnerability assessment
perspective the office has broad control of enterprise monitoring. The policies and the
implementation of policies are applied to the continuous monitoring plan that the state has in
place. They are an extension of the security policies and are direct indicators of whether or not
the state is meeting the right standard and meeting the intent of the security policies. The
Department of Enterprise Security Risk Management office also manages cyber awareness
training. The state does not have a cybersecurity committee or a governing body outside of the
office; this could be beneficial as it would pull in various elements that are not being taken into
consideration at the time being. The state would like to have representatives from academia, the
private sector, and state and local government in a consolidated group to help make decisions for
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a whole-of-state approach. The decentralized model in place is not seen as a strength. The State
of North Carolina cybersecurity governance initiative has the support of the governor and
legislature; however, funding is stopping them from moving to a more centralized approach.
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Executive Summary
Cybersecurity threats are an ever-present organizational risk on par with economic, legal,
operational, financial, and political risks. They increasingly affect state assets. Managing these
risks, and the threats from which they stem, must be part of a state’s overall risk management
portfolio. To do this, state leaders must have effective cybersecurity governance.
Cybersecurity governance is the processes by which
decisions are made about cybersecurity risk. Effective
cybersecurity governance provides the mix of control
and influence necessary and appropriate for a state,
and includes mechanisms for mitigating and
responding to risk.

Managing Cyber Threats through
Effective Governance
A Call to Action
This document is a Call to Action for
governors and state legislatures to improve
their
cybersecurity risk management
capabilities by creating or strengthening their
cybersecurity governance. It presents four
action steps and a set of tools to guide the
decisions states must make and execute to
respond to an ever-increasing and evolving
threat to state assets and operations.

While every state has implemented cybersecurity
programs, few have cybersecurity governance that
effectively ensures that a state’s risk is managed to a
level and in ways that have been determined to be,
through formalized governance processes, acceptable
to the governor and legislature. An effective
cybersecurity governance framework answers important questions such as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What decisions need to be made about cybersecurity threats?
Who makes those decisions?
How are those decisions made?
What mechanisms exist to inform those decisions?
Who has responsibility for translating decisions made by cybersecurity governance into
effective cybersecurity programs?
6. What processes exist to make sure that the cybersecurity programs are effective?
This Call to Action presents four steps to be taken by governors and state legislatures to establish
or strengthen their cybersecurity governance:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Establish Authorities through Executive Order and Legislation
Formalize Key Processes
Assign Roles and Responsibilities
Monitor Performance of Cybersecurity Governance Framework and Adapt as
Necessary

It also includes nine tools that states have found useful in strengthening their cybersecurity
governance, as well as questions that governors and state legislatures can ask to help determine
whether their cybersecurity governance is effective in addressing and minimizing the threats their
states face.
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Once established, cybersecurity governance must be agile, allowing cybersecurity programs to
evolve as new threats that require adaptations in risk management strategies emerge. As smaller
organizations become increasingly aware of their limits in understanding threats and managing
their risk, they are looking to state partners for assistance. Expanding scope beyond executive level
agency assets, to a ‘whole of state’ perspective that engages stakeholders across multiple sectors
and levels of government in a coordinated and collaborative process of risk management is
increasingly recognized as an important step in managing a state’s cybersecurity risks.
An Increasing Threat to State Assets
Cyber threats pose an increasingly significant risk to state governments and to the services that the
public depend on. The information technology infrastructure that states have grown to rely on over
the past half century poses as much risk to their operations as the lead water pipes and rusting
bridges that more visibly demand our attention. Managing these risks must be part of a state’s
overall risk management portfolio. To do this, state leaders must have effective cybersecurity
governance.
In some states, governance structures are defined through executive orders and administrative
code. Other states use legislation to formally establish governance. Some states have found that
while their governors and other top elected officials have attempted to increase cybersecurity
capability and capacity, efforts have fallen short due to the lack of a formally established
governance structure. Without an overarching governance structure, it is difficult to sustain
coherent and consistent cybersecurity programs and practices.
This document is a Call to Action for governors and state legislatures to strengthen their
cybersecurity risk management capability through creating or strengthening their cybersecurity
governance. It presents four recommended action steps and a set of tools to guide the decisions
that must be made and executed if states are to be prepared to respond to ever-increasing and
evolving threats to state assets.

The Frontier of Cybersecurity
“The frontier of cybersecurity today is ensuring that time-tested, risk-based techniques for hardening systems,
training users, and sharing information are implemented, sustained, and coordinated. Organizations accomplish
these objectives through governance, the ‘formal and informal institutions that [influence how] a group of
people determine what to decide, how to decide, and who shall decide’.”
Garcia, Forscey, and Blute
Beyond the Network: A Holistic Perspective on State Cybersecurity Governance
96 NEB. L. REV. 252 (2017); https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol96/iss2/3

What is Cybersecurity Governance?
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Cybersecurity governance is the processes by which
Fighting with One Army
decisions are made about cybersecurity risk, and
effective programs that manage that risk to a degree that … we’re fighting with five armies and
is acceptable to the governor and legislature. If done we need to be fighting with one.. There
has to be an army of one to be really
well, cybersecurity governance defines priorities,
effective in cybersecurity in the
processes, metrics, tolerances, and implementation
government. And that happens in
methods. It is codified in legislation and executive orders governance. State Name
that provide a framework for written policies and
procedures. It integrates with and reflects the structure
of the state’s overall IT governance. And, most importantly, cybersecurity governance establishes
a state-specific structure to be followed by the state’s cybersecurity operational teams when
identifying, quantifying, and managing cybersecurity risks on a state-wide level.
Every state has cybersecurity programs: offices, standards, guidebooks, procedures, and incident
response plans that protect the state from cyber threats and enable it to respond quickly when that
protection fails. Cybersecurity governance, on the other hand, is the framework that guides these
programs and links them to the state’s risk management processes. Cybersecurity governance:
•
•
•
•
•

Consists of the executive level decision-making processes and the policies and procedures
for overseeing the cybersecurity programs;
Provides the necessary control and influence a state’s elected leaders need to have over
their state’s cybersecurity programs;
Establishes clear definitions and assigns roles and responsibilities;
Defines processes, tolerances, metrics, priorities, and implementation methods; and
Links the state’s cybersecurity programs into decision-making processes that enable the
state’s elected leaders to understand and minimize the cybersecurity risks that their state
faces.

If done well, a cybersecurity governance framework answers important questions like:
•
•
•
•
•
•

What decisions need to be made about cybersecurity threats?
Who makes those decisions?
How are those decisions made?
What mechanisms exist to inform those decisions?
Who has responsibility for translating decisions made by cybersecurity governance into
effective cybersecurity programs?
What processes exist to make sure that the cybersecurity programs are effective?
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While every state has cybersecurity programs, not all states
Reducing Risk by Reducing
have effective cybersecurity governance that ensures the
Waivers
state’s risk is managed at an appropriate level and to a
One of the biggest threats I’ve seen
sufficient degree. As a governor and legislature, understanding to our cybersecurity programs is
the risk the state faces and the programs to mitigate those risks the granting of waivers. If we had
provides an impetus for improving the state’s cybersecurity. In effective cyber governance, waivers
today’s cyber risk environment – where essential services could be limited to very specific
depend on technology working and where our cyber conditions. State Name
adversaries get smarter and more sophisticated every day – it
is essential that states establish effective cyber governance so that they can adapt quickly and keep
up with the increasing and changing threats to state assets.
Agility: A Critical Cybersecurity Governance Design Priority
As governors and state legislatures commit to taking action to manage their risk, they must also
recognize that creating and strengthening cybersecurity governance requires a continuous process
of understanding cyber threats and translating that knowledge into appropriate cybersecurity
actions. A cyclic “risk-based” approach ensures that a state has the agility necessary to successfully
evolve its cybersecurity risk management capability. Cybersecurity governance must be tailored
to keep up with current risks and agile enough to adapt to future risks.

Building Understanding of Threats,
Vulnerabilities, Capabilities, and
Potential Response Strategies

Protecting State Assets
Against Cyber Threats
Creating and Strengthening
Cybersecurity Governance

Establishing
Cybersecurity
Governance within a Specific State Context
State government leaders must manage risk within a context where power is distributed across
sectors and levels and branches of government. Regardless of the structures and local culture that
a governor and state legislature must operate within, they must establish cybersecurity governance
that provides the mix of control and influence necessary and appropriate for their state, and that
includes mechanisms for mitigating and responding to risk.
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Most states have already established some form of cybersecurity governance. Some have the
“centralized structure” recommended by many experts, essentially placing decision-making
authority on cybersecurity in one or more central organizations and, in many cases, embedding
cybersecurity governance within the state’s centralized information technology services
organization. Others have a more decentralized approach to establishing the desired control and
influence, while still others have implemented hybrid models with a mix of centralized and
decentralized authorities, roles, and responsibilities.
Many organizations, including the National Association Cybersecurity Governance Approaches
of State Chief Information Officers, strongly recommend
a centralized approach to cybersecurity governance1. Centralized. Authority and decisionmaking vested within a central body.
While full centralization may be out of reach for many Decentralized. Authority and decisionstates given their current culture and structures, evolving making distributed to individual
away from fully decentralized toward centralization is organizations.
highly recommended. Ultimately, of course, day-to-day Hybrid. Authority and decision-making
responsibility for managing cyber risk falls to the distributed between a central body and
individual sub-organizations.
governor, like it does for all of the state’s risks.
Regardless of where a state starts with cyber governance,
what is in place must support a tolerance for risk that reflects the intentions of the governor and
legislature. It must put in place policies and processes that enable the elected officials to understand
the state’s risks and act effectively to manage those risks.
Four Actions Steps for Governors and State Legislatures
When establishing cybersecurity governance, whether through executive order, legislation, or
administrative code, governors and state legislatures must ensure that their cybersecurity
governance has the elements necessary to effectively manage their risks. The governance structure
must designate specific units with both responsibility for cybersecurity and the authority to carry
out those responsibilities. It must spell out how authority should be exercised and where
collaboration with other stakeholders should take place in preparing for and responding to
cybersecurity threats.
Four action steps are being used across the United States by governors and state legislatures as
they work to establish cybersecurity governance (See also Appendix A):
1. Establish Authorities through Executive Order and Legislation. Executive
orders and legislation are being used by governors to formally establish the entities
and authorities required to govern cybersecurity. Such authorities are being designed
to overcome existing fragmentation in cyber governance and, where possible, are
leveraging strong existing governance structures.

1

Put a link to NASCIO document regarding centralization here.

104

2. Formalize Key Processes. An effective governance framework formalizes key
processes, including financial, procurement, technical standards, and risk
assessment, necessary to effectively identify and manage cyber risks.
3. Assign Roles and Responsibilities. An effective governance framework includes
an assignment of roles and responsibilities for designing and implementing the
state’s cybersecurity program as directed by the governor and/or legislature.
4. Monitor Performance of Cybersecurity Programs and Adapt as Necessary. An
effective cybersecurity governance framework has performance metrics for the
state’s cyber risk management. It requires performance metrics for cybersecurity
operations, but does not establish them.
Tools for Cybersecurity Governance
Nine tools are being used by states to execute the authorities established in their governance
frameworks (See Appendix B for the detailed list of tools).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Enterprise Architecture
Cyber Risk Assessments
Control over IT Procurement and Acquisition
Control over Network Connectivity
Councils and Advisory Boards
Complementary Legislation
Collaboration and Shared Services Agreements
Monitor Workforce Requirements and Close Gaps

Tool Example: Control over Network Connectivity
State Name. We’re our own service provider, and we also serve as a service provider to the other elected
constitutional offices. And, so that gives us the ability to funnel network traffic through a shared set of appliances
that we manage and maintain and provide to them.
State Name. We've got network connectivity into all seven constitutional branches of government. So, we have
visibility into everything at a network level across the whole state. That provides us a leg up in that we have the
ability to capture, protect, and look at the information coming across at a network layer to make sure that we
are being protected.

These tools are critical to states’ efforts to gain compliance, even within executive agencies, with
the standard policies and procedures required to systematically manage risk. Critical to the success
of cybersecurity governance, and to the use of these tools, is the existence of some level of effective
information technology governance. Governance tools such as the use of formal risk assessments
and standards are more well-known and used. Where there is a recognized need for organizations
to work together and authority to compel participation is limited or missing, other tools, such as
agreements and collaborations are necessary. These tools are critical for addressing the often weak
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or missing authority that executive agencies have to establish the interagency, intergovernmental,
and inter-sectoral agreements that are necessary to formalize collaborations.
Expanding Scope: Building a Whole of State Risk Management Program
This document provides a recommended set of actions for governors and state legislatures to take
today in creating and strengthening their cybersecurity governance. The need for cybersecurity
governance isn’t static; strategies must evolve if states are going to effectively protect state
government assets. States must improve their governance to ensure that they are ready to adapt as
new threats emerge and require new risk management strategies.
Increasingly, states’ success will correlate with the extent to which they are able to expand the
scope of their cybersecurity governance across all of the state’s public and private critical
infrastructures. This implies incremental expansion from executive level agency assets to a ‘whole
of state’ perspective that engages stakeholders across all
Ready for Next Order Problems
sectors in a collaborative process of risk management.
As smaller organizations become increasingly aware of the
limits to their ability to locally manage risk, expansion will
become increasingly acceptable and expected. This may be
reflected in governance that evolves from predictable and
stable funding to funding that is commensurate with the
state’s position with respect to actual measured risk.

Because of the things [we’ve done] like
being centralized, having staff, having
budget, we’ve been able to start
focusing on those next order problems.
Like, what do you do to protect and help
the locals? How do you partner with
industry? State Name

Expanding Scope
State Name. The state education department in STATE NAME, for example, is required by law to establish
minimum standards for security and privacy of student data. This is being accomplished through a collaboration
between the state education department staff and the state CISO.
State Name. School districts are required by law to follow a cyber-framework and are required to report incidents
to the state education department.
State Name. A senate bill set forth the ability to align cybersecurity strategy across all seven branches of
government in STATE NAME.

In some states, such adaptation may mean expanding authority from solely controlling network
connections to controlling IT procurement. In other states, it may mean expanding the scope of
authority beyond state government2 or building collaborations that lead to joint agreements about
how cybersecurity threats will be managed across levels of government and into key sectors
including local government. In many cases, it will lead to both. What is critical, regardless of the
maturity of any single state’s cybersecurity governance, is an ongoing commitment to governance
2

https://www.nascio.org/resource-center/resources/stronger-together-state-and-local-cybersecurity-collaboration/

106

that is adaptable and responsive. A commitment to governance ensures that states, and not just
state governments, are ready as threats evolve.

Critical Success Factors for Effective Cybersecurity Governance: Willing Participants, Champions,
Moral Responsibility, Collective Approach, Data Driven, and Forward Thinking

You have to find those willing participants, and you have to find that champion that can effectively
message the ultimate effects of a cyber-attack. We have a moral responsibility to protect the citizens
of our state, so it's going to take a collective approach to protecting the infrastructure, the people, the
data, and everything that goes with it on a day-to-day basis. You need to first and foremost
understand what your current state is in order to determine what you need to do for the future.
State Name
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A. Managing Cyber Threats through Effective Governance: A Call to Action for Governors and
State Legislatures – Four Action Steps
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C. Managing Cyber Threats through Effective Governance: A Call to Action for Governors and
State Legislatures - Recommended Cybersecurity Governance Indicators
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APPENDIX A: Managing Cyber Threats through Effective Governance
A Call to Action for Governors and State Legislatures
Four Action Steps

#

Action

Action Description
Issue executive orders and enact legislation to formally establish the entities and
authorities required to govern cybersecurity in your state.

1

Establish
Authorities

a. Leverage the strengths of existing governance structures.
b. Design authorities to overcome fragmentation in cybersecurity governance and
programs within the state.

•

Ensure the governance framework includes formalization of key processes
necessary to manage risk.
• This can take the form of the definition, ongoing review, and implementation
of processes designed to effectively identify and manage cyber risks (financial,
procurement, technical standards, risk assessment processes) including
responding to questions such as:
o How are cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and risks determined?
o What level of cyber risk is acceptable to our governor and state
legislature?
o Who determines what controls to put in place to mitigate risk to an
2
Formalize
acceptable level?
Key
o How will controls be monitored on an ongoing basis and revised to
Processes
respond to changing conditions?
• Of particular importance are the processes required for ensuring predictable
and stable funding to those charged with the ongoing responsibility for
cybersecurity governance and those authorized through that governance to
assess cybersecurity threats, design and execute responses, develop technical
architectures/standards, and help to conceive and implement required
processes.
• Ensure the governance framework includes processes for assigning the roles
and responsibilities each of the state’s units will take in designing and
implementing the state’s cybersecurity program.
o This includes state government program units, its IT units and any
dedicated cybersecurity units, and external entities including the MultiState Information Sharing and Analysis Center® (MS-ISAC®) and federal
3 Assign Roles
and private sector cybersecurity units.
and
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Responsibili
ties

• Ensure the governance framework includes processes for assigning the roles
and responsibilities each of the state’s units will take in establishing and
managing collaborative approaches to cybersecurity.

•

4

Monitor
Performanc •
e and Adapt
as Necessary

Ensure your state’s cybersecurity governance requires the use of robust and
relevant indicators in decision-making and establish policies and procedures
for guiding their management and use.
Ensure cybersecurity governance requires the creation and ongoing review of
robust and relevant indicators that go beyond the reporting of incidents and
that guide cybersecurity governance strategy and execution.
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APPENDIX B: Managing Cyber Threats through Effective Governance

A Call to Action for Governors and State Legislatures

Nine Cybersecurity Governance Tools
#

1

2

3

5

6

Tool

Tool Description

Enterprise
Architecture

An Enterprise Architecture (EA) is a critical tool for establishing technical
standards for an enterprise. It defines a set of agreed upon standards and provides
a touchstone for all technical investments. It is also a critical tool for modeling the
potential negative consequences of investments that fall outside of the established
standards.

Cyber Risk
Assessments

Many states require cyber risk assessments as part of regular reporting cycles,
procurement decisions, and connecting to various networks. Such assessments
create visibility of risks and reinforce adoption of security best practices and
products. They make it possible for information about the threat potential related
to any one action or group of actions to be available for use in decision-making.

Control over
IT
Procurement
and
Acquisitions

Control over
Network
Connectivity

Many states place the Chief Information Officer and/or the Chief Information
Security Officer (CIO and CISO) on the critical path to IT procurement. Authority
over IT procurement in executive agencies makes it possible for these officials to
require that IT procurements meet state security standards and that selected
procurements include an assessment of cyber risk. Establishing this level of
authority over IT procurement in non-executive agencies is a long-term goal of
cybersecurity governance bodies in many states.
Some states are able to manage risk because they have authority to control what
connects to their networks. In these states, CIOs and CISOs have been granted
authority to require those seeking to connect to state networks to comply with the
rules as established through governance processes. This authority provides the CIO
and CISO indirect authority over IT procurement (i.e., if the item you want to
purchase doesn’t meet our standards, we can’t stop you from buying it, but you
may not connect it to the state’s network).
Many states are using Governance Councils and Advisory Boards as vehicles to
execute cybersecurity governance put forward in executive orders and legislation.
These bodies are often used to interpret executive orders and legislation, establish
111

7

Councils and
Advisory
Boards

operational policies and procedures for cybersecurity programs, and to monitor
their performance.

Complement
ary
Legislation

Some states are passing laws that complement existing cybersecurity governance
legislation to focus on specific priority domains, such as school districts and
student data.
Interagency. Many state CIOs and CISOs only have authority over executive
agencies under the control of the governor, and not those of separately elected
officials. Interagency agreements, including joint decision-making bodies, are
being used in many states to bridge these gaps to create coherent government-wide
cybersecurity programs at the state level.

8

9

Collaboratio
n and Shared Intergovernmental. In most states, the state CIO and CISO have no authority
over local government cybersecurity. However, a few states are moving to
Services
Agreements formalize authority and responsibilities for non-state government assets from a
cybersecurity perspective. Many states are investing in the development of
intergovernmental agreements and other collaboration tools focused on
cybersecurity and, in particular, joint governance and shared operational
capability. For instance, some states have highly centralized elections operations
where the state, often through a state board of elections, directs procurements and
standards for local election systems.
Monitor
Workforce
Requirement
s and Close
Gaps

Many states are struggling to fill cybersecurity positions. One strategy for filling
those positions and providing the continuous training required to stay current is to
ensure your state’s cybersecurity governance has policies and procedures for
regularly identifying necessary cybersecurity skills and making provisions for
buying and/or building those skills. These skills should include the ability to create
and use indicators of program effectiveness, to perform risk assessments, and to
effectively communicate risk to key stakeholders.

112

APPENDIX C: Managing Cyber Threats through Effective Governance

A Call to Action for Governors and State Legislatures

Recommended Cybersecurity Governance Indicators
There are many metrics for assessing the adequacy of cybersecurity programs, but few for assessing
cyber governance programs. A state’s cybersecurity governance is effective if it reduces the state’s
risk. However, because there are few commonly-accepted metrics for measuring risk, measuring the
effectiveness of governance is difficult. Furthermore, no states publish measurements of their cyber
risk, so there are few benchmarks from other states for comparative purposes.
Below we list some questions that governors and state legislatures should have answers to if their
cybersecurity governance is effective in addressing and minimizing the threats their states face.
Category

Preparedness
Incident Response

#

Cybersecurity Governance Indicator

1

Do we know what the three biggest cyber risks are to our state? What are we doing
about them?

2

Have we been told how we are protecting our state’s most important assets from the
cyber threats they face?

3

Do we know what the roles of the agency and the IT departments are for protecting
each agency’s information assets?

5

Do we get briefed on the annual Nationwide Cyber Security Review (NCSR)?

6

Do we have an annual cyber risk assessment conducted by a reputable third party?

7

Do we perform regular email phishing exercises for our employees?

8

Do we have an annual tabletop exercise to test out our ability to respond quickly to a
significant disruptive cyber incident?

9

Do we know who is in charge when we have such an incident?

1
0

Do we have pre-prepared templates for communicating with our employees and the
public if an incident occurs?
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1
1

What do we do if the incident is so severe that our resources can't handle it? What is
our backup plan? If we are depending on cyber responders from other organizations,
what if they are occupied dealing with their own incidents?

1
2

If the incident is accompanied by or causes kinetic effects and other physical
disruptions, how are our emergency management and cyber responses going to work
together? Have we done tabletop exercises to shake down how well our cyber
processes integrate with our physical disruption processes?

1
3

Do we have an annual tabletop exercise with our agencies and IT units to test out our
ability to recover from a cyber incident that causes significant and long-lasting
disruptions to operations?

14 Do we perform an annual review of the incidents we have experienced? What does it
tell us, and how is it informing our state’s protective measures?

Overall

15 Are the state’s Chief Risk Officer, the governor’s Homeland Security Advisor, and the
Chief Information Officer synchronized? Do they all give the same answers to the
above questions?
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Appendix E: Permission from Employer to use Data
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Appendix F: WCU IRB Approval Letter
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